In the summer and fall of 1983, British Columbia experienced one of the largest episodes of extra-parliamentary working-class mobilisation of the era. What began as opposition to the Social Credit government’s sweeping restraint program developed over four months into a province-wide movement encompassing trade unions, tenants, women’s organisations, human-rights groups, unemployed workers, teachers, social-service organisations and many others. Workers occupied and operated Tranquille Institution outside Kamloops, more than 60,000 people surrounded the Social Credit convention in Vancouver, approximately 35,000 provincial government workers struck, teachers followed them out, and Operation Solidarity prepared an escalating sequence of strikes that could eventually have involved approximately 200,000 workers.1
Yet the confrontation ended abruptly. On November 13, International Woodworkers of America leader Jack Munro met Premier Bill Bennett at Bennett’s Kelowna home. The resulting “Kelowna Accord” obtained important concessions on trade-union rights, but produced considerably less on the broader social demands around which the Solidarity Coalition had mobilised. The escalating strike movement ended without a province-wide rank-and-file vote on the political settlement. The meaning of this conclusion has been disputed ever since. Some historians have emphasised bureaucratic demobilisation and a lost opportunity for a general strike; others have stressed the real concessions won, the uneven readiness of workers for continued escalation, and the danger that a prolonged confrontation could have isolated the movement politically.2
For communists studying the experience, Jack Scott’s short chapter “Reflections on Solidarity” in A Communist Life is particularly valuable. Scott had spent decades inside the Canadian workers’ movement and was no defender of the established labour bureaucracy. Yet his retrospective assessment resisted the idea that calling an unlimited general strike would automatically have solved the political problems confronting Solidarity. His warning was severe: Bennett could have appealed over the heads of the unions to the wider population by asking, “Who is going to rule the country? Us or the unions?”3
Scott’s point raises a problem larger than the tactical question of whether one more sector should have been called out. Once an economic and political strike develops far enough, the issue is no longer merely whether workers possess the ability to stop society. It becomes whether they have developed sufficient organisation, political support and an alternative centre of authority to answer the question their own action has raised. That question is the central lesson running through Operation Solidarity.
From the Restraint Program to a Mass Opposition
On July 7, 1983, shortly after winning re-election, Bill Bennett’s Social Credit government introduced a package of 26 bills accompanied by severe spending reductions. The measures did not attack a single section of the population. Bills 2 and 3 threatened public-sector collective bargaining, seniority and job security; approximately 1,600 provincial employees received layoff notices. Other measures affected rent protections, human-rights institutions, education, employment standards and social services. By attacking numerous constituencies simultaneously, the government created the objective conditions for those constituencies to recognise a common opponent.4
That objective unity did not organise itself. On July 15, BC Federation of Labour president Art Kube convened affiliated and non-affiliated unions to establish Operation Solidarity. Longstanding jurisdictional and political divisions in the labour movement had to be temporarily suppressed through practical agreements, common financing and a joint steering structure. The new organisation represented roughly 400,000 unionised workers, and its steering committee was given authority to call a general strike. A substantial campaign fund was established.5
Kube’s later oral history stresses a point that can disappear when the history is reduced to huge demonstrations of mass mobilisation rested upon years of accumulated organisation. “These things don’t happen overnight,” he recalled.6 Unions already possessed local officers, shop stewards, staff, membership records, money, meeting spaces and communications networks. The unemployment movement had also established Action Centres that could be incorporated into regional organising. A demonstration involving tens of thousands was therefore not simply the product of a persuasive leaflet or the spontaneous anger of individuals. Existing institutions gave that anger the ability to act collectively.
Periods of relative quiet determine much of what becomes possible during an exceptional crisis. A movement cannot quickly invent trusted workplace organisers, inter-union relationships, communications networks and local centres after tens of thousands have already begun moving. The capacity that appears suddenly in a crisis is usually organisation accumulated beforehand.
At the same time, Operation Solidarity was not the entire movement. A broader “Solidarity Coalition” developed alongside it, encompassing women’s organisations, tenants, unemployed workers, minority organisations, environmentalists, disability advocates, churches, professionals and other community organisations. Ted Richmond and John Shields emphasise that labour and Communist Party activists played important initiating roles, but the movement quickly grew beyond the organisational strength of the communists themselves. By August, the opposition had become a genuine provincial social movement united more by opposition to Bennett’s program than by agreement on a comprehensive alternative.7
This distinction between Operation Solidarity, rooted in the unions, and the Solidarity Coalition, rooted in a much broader social opposition, would later become decisive.
Tranquille Is When Workplace Organisation Moved Beyond Ordinary Trade Unionism
The most concrete example of worker self-organisation during the movement occurred not in Vancouver but at Tranquille Institution outside Kamloops. After the government announced that the facility would close, approximately 600 BCGEU workers faced not only the loss or displacement of their jobs but uncertainty concerning the hundreds of residents with developmental and physical disabilities for whom they cared.8
The workers’ response went beyond a conventional withdrawal of labour. On July 19 they occupied the institution, excluded management from ordinary control, established sentries and continued operating the facility. Shop stewards immediately organised schedules through which workers alternated between working, remaining overnight at the institution and returning home. Gary Steeves, one of the organisers, recalled that departmental schedules were established extremely quickly. Most importantly, the workers elected an occupation council consisting of “one or two representatives from every shift in every department.” The council met regularly and made the occupation’s major decisions.9 Representation grew from the actual organisation of labour inside the institution: department, shift, representative, council. Existing workplace organisation provided the raw material for a more advanced democratic form.
That being said, the council was temporary, remained connected to an established union, did not claim ownership of the institution and did not constitute an alternative government. Yet minimising it would be equally mistaken. For 22 days, workers demonstrated that the practical coordination of a complicated institution did not require the ordinary managerial hierarchy. Necessary work continued. Residents continued receiving care. Maintenance continued. The institution’s fire department operated. The workers still required administration, scheduling, technical expertise and division of labour, but these functions were increasingly subordinated to an authority created by the workers themselves.10
One incident described by Steeves captures this distinction particularly well. When air conditioning failed in a ward housing vulnerable residents during hot weather, workers discovered that a replacement unit had already been purchased but left uninstalled. During the occupation they found the unit, assembled the necessary tradespeople and equipment, arranged a crane and installed it. Steeves’s conclusion was simple: “The workers knew what they were doing.”11
The broader lesson is that serious workplace organisation requires knowledge not merely of grievances but of how the workplace actually functions. Workers collectively possess knowledge of production, maintenance, schedules, safety, supply, staffing and technical processes that is normally fragmented by managerial authority. Tranquille demonstrates that militancy is not measured simply by prolonging the most confrontational tactic. After 22 days, workers were exhausted; considerable public support had been generated; protections against retaliation had been achieved; and the wider fight over Bills 2 and 3 was moving toward a province-wide confrontation. The occupation ended. Its significance came from what it developed and demonstrated, not from occupation becoming an end in itself.12
From a Popular Coalition To a Political Strike
Through the summer and early autumn, Solidarity moved through successive stages. Large demonstrations were followed by petitions, occupations, regional organising and increasingly explicit discussion of strike action. On October 15, more than 60,000 people surrounded the Social Credit convention at the Hotel Vancouver. By the beginning of November, the centre of gravity shifted decisively from demonstrations toward industrial action.13
The BCGEU entered the confrontation with extensive preparation. Contemporary reporting in the November 2 Solidarity Times described geographic strike zones, approximately 50 zone representatives and 500 picket captains in the Lower Mainland alone, daily strike bulletins and established strike-pay arrangements. Approximately 35,000 government workers struck after their agreement expired.14 This is important evidence that the confrontation did not arise simply because leaders announced a “general strike.” Considerable practical organisation had already been undertaken inside the union.
Operation Solidarity then planned successive waves. Teachers and education employees would join on November 8, Crown corporation workers on November 10, followed by ferries and municipal workers, public transit and finally hospital workers. Had the sequence run its course, around 200,000 workers might have been off the job.15
Teachers are particularly revealing. Only 59 percent voted for the action, a result BCTF vice-president Pat Clarke openly acknowledged was “not a terrific mandate.” Yet actual participation once the strike commenced was far higher. Sara Slinn records participation above 85 percent and emphasises how participation in Solidarity contributed to the BCTF’s subsequent transformation into a more explicitly trade-union organisation. Larry Kuehn later described the experience as producing a psychological change among teachers. Communications infrastructure mattered as well. The BCTF had developed an electronic network linking locals across BC, allowing teachers on picket lines in one part of the province to learn rapidly what was happening elsewhere.16 Here an important lesson is collective action itself changes confidence and understanding. Participation can make possibilities concrete that previously existed only as arguments.
By November, the movement was therefore approaching something qualitatively different from an accumulation of collective-bargaining disputes. Workers were withdrawing labour not simply to compel individual employers to sign contracts but to force a provincial government to alter legislation and public policy. The strike was becoming explicitly political.
1BC Labour Heritage Centre, “Operation Solidarity,” digital timeline, entries for October 15 and November 1–13, 1983; Solidarity Times, November 2, 1983, 2.
2Ted Richmond and John Shields, “Reflections on Resistance to Neoliberalism: Looking Back on Solidarity in 1983 British Columbia,” Socialist Studies/Études socialistes 7, nos. 1–2 (2011): 225–229; Bryan D. Palmer, Solidarity: The Rise and Fall of an Opposition in British Columbia (Vancouver: New Star Books, 1987).
3Jack Scott, A Communist Life: Jack Scott and the Canadian Workers Movement, 1927–1985, ed. Bryan D. Palmer (St. John’s: Canadian Committee on Labour History, 1988), 254–256.
4Richmond and Shields, “Reflections on Resistance,” 221–223; BC Labour Heritage Centre, “Operation Solidarity.”
5Richmond and Shields, “Reflections on Resistance,” 223; BC Labour Heritage Centre, “The 1983 Tranquille Occupation,” podcast, discussion at approximately 15:06.
6Art Kube, “Summer of Solidarity,” interview by the BC Labour Heritage Centre, September 5, 2018, approximately 11:00–14:00.
7Richmond and Shields, “Reflections on Resistance,” 222–224.
8BC Labour Heritage Centre, “The 1983 Tranquille Occupation,” podcast and transcript; Gary Steeves, interview in the BC Labour Heritage Centre Oral History Collection.
9Gary Steeves, “The 1983 Tranquille Occupation,” BC Labour Heritage Centre Oral History Collection, approximately 28:35; see also the edited podcast, approximately 13:22–15:06.
10BC Labour Heritage Centre, “The 1983 Tranquille Occupation,” podcast and transcript.
11Steeves, “The 1983 Tranquille Occupation,” discussion of the Greaves Ward air-conditioning replacement.
12Ibid., approximately 23:49–27:00.
13BC Labour Heritage Centre, “Operation Solidarity,” entry for October 15, 1983.
14Solidarity Times, November 2, 1983, 2.
15BC Labour Heritage Centre, “Operation Solidarity,” entries for November 8–13, 1983.
16Sara Slinn, “Structuring Reality So That the Law Will Follow: British Columbia Teachers’ Quest for Collective Bargaining Rights,” Labour/Le Travail 68 (Fall 2011): 48–49; Larry Kuehn, interview by the BC Labour Heritage Centre, part 2, approximately 21:16–22:55.