The Ideological, Political, Organizational and Military Lessons of the People's War in Turkey, 1972–2005 – by Pierro C.

I. A History of Sacrifice and Its Accounting

The history of the People's War in Turkey, historically waged under the banner of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism by the Communist Party of Turkey (Marxist-Leninist) [TKP(ML)] and its successor organizations, is a history of extraordinary sacrifice punctuated by devastating defeats. Across more than three decades of armed struggle, the party lost over five hundred martyrs, including its most valuable leaders and commanders, and yet, as the party's own congress documents acknowledge, it arrived at a position "quite backward" relative to the cost paid in blood [1]. The First Congress of the Maoist Communist Party (MKP), heir to the TKP(ML), opened its thirty-year historical accounting with a telling slogan: The revolution needs not people who never make mistakes, but people who make mistakes and correct them [2]. This framing was itself a criticism, for the congress acknowledged that throughout its three decades of struggle the party had never been able to position itself in accordance with its nature and aims, nor to submit its history to a genuinely Marxist-Leninist-Maoist accounting. Every new assessment met conservative resistance, and previous leaderships had evaluated the party's history eclectically, sometimes from the "left" and sometimes from the right, instead of drawing correct lessons from errors [3].

The party's own assessments, principally the First and Second Congress documents, attribute this not primarily to the strength of the enemy but to a recurring pattern of subjective errors. The historical accounting of the people's war in Turkey between 1972 and 2005 is, at the most fundamental level, the history of a correct revolutionary strategy repeatedly distorted by incorrect political lines and, above all, of the failure to take strategic leadership seriously, to institutionalize it, protect it, and understand its determining role in protracted revolutionary war [1][4]. The five General Secretaries, from İbrahim Kaypakkaya through Süleyman Cihan, Kazım Çelik, Cüneyt Kahraman, Cafer Cangöz, and the seventeen cadres lost at Mercan Valley, form a tragic continuum in which the same lessons were paid for again and again without being fully absorbed.

II. Kaypakkaya's Theoretical Legacy

The theoretical foundation laid by İbrahim Kaypakkaya was sound. The TKP(ML) was founded on 24 April 1972 in the Kürecik mountains of Malatya by Kaypakkaya and other leading cadres, as the defender and qualitative re-creation of the communist legacy of Mustafa Suphi's TKP [2]. Kaypakkaya alone wrote and systematized all of the party's fundamental theoretical views, from the Critique of the TİİKP Draft Programme and Let Us Grasp Correctly the Red Political Power Doctrine of Chairman Mao to the writings on Kemalism and the national question [5][6]. These documents established that Turkey-

Northern Kurdistan was a semi-colonial, semi-feudal, multinational socio-economic formation, that the Democratic People's Revolution was directed against imperialism, comprador bureaucrat capitalism and feudalism, that the essence of the democratic revolution was a land revolution based on the poor peasantry, and that the rule of the dominant classes had been fascist from the very beginning [7]. Crucially, Kaypakkaya grounded the strategy of encircling the cities from the countryside not merely in the weight of feudalism or the peasant majority, but in two combined factors, namely the essence of the democratic revolution as an agrarian revolution and imperialism's thorough control of the cities and advanced regions, which made the backward rural areas the soft underbelly of the enemy [8][9].

Kaypakkaya not only formulated the correct general political line of the Turkey-Northern Kurdistan revolution but also laid down a correct military line encompassing guerrilla warfare and the nature and tasks of the army [10]. The theses he and his comrades advanced in April 1971, namely that rural activity is primary, that armed struggle is principal, that strategic defense is essential when the enemy is stronger nationally, and that guerrilla warfare in the villages is the form of struggle in the period of strategic defense, were correct [6]. His programmatic views were nothing other than the scientific application of Maoism to the concrete conditions of Turkey and Northern Kurdistan [11], and he himself insisted that the movement was a product of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution [12].

III. The First Organizational Defeat and the Murder of Kaypakkaya

The first great error was already made in the founding moment, a left-subjectivist assessment of the political conjuncture. The situation determination of early 1972 treated objective conditions as highly favorable to revolution when in reality the 12 March military coup had produced a temporary stability among the ruling classes under a parliamentarist-masked open fascism, a semi-military fascist dictatorship. The revolutionary situation was not rising but stagnating and receding, a period which other petite bourgeoise armed revolutionary organizations were defeated (THKP/C, THKO) while the party itself was still an embryo without even an inter-regional organizational network [13][14]. The Maoist party 1st congress's self-criticism on this point is strikingly honest. "We evaluated reality not as it was, but as we wished it to be," it admits, and the burning desire to break the chain of passivism and take up arms immediately was substituted for objective reality [15]. In both objective and subjective assessment, the party "underestimated the enemy's forces tactically" and "exaggerated the revolutionary forces beyond what they were," committing "a grave error." The correct assessment would have been that the revolutionary wave was, at least temporarily, in retreat, and that the central task was to accelerate the party's ideological-political-organizational construction and hold its congress, subordinating all other tasks to this [16]. Instead, the party chose the path of immediately generalizing armed struggle without making the necessary subjective preparations, and the premature armed actions in Dersim made the

party the primary target of the fascist dictatorship, leading to successive heavy blows [16].

The practical consequence was that the party met its First Organizational Defeat within barely a year of its founding, before it could hold its first congress and before guerrilla war could be launched, since the actions of that first year were individual guerrilla actions and the planned launch of guerrilla war had been deferred to after the congress [17]. The defeat process claimed the party's first martyrs, Meral Yakar, Ali Haydar Yıldız, Ahmet Muharrem Çiçek, and finally Kaypakkaya himself, captured and murdered under torture in May 1973 [18]. While Kaypakkaya's capture was an enormous blow to ideological, political, and organizational leadership, the defeat itself should be dated to the collapse of the Istanbul region, not to his individual capture [18]. The errors of this period were tactical rather than strategic, and they did not negate the correctness of the party's programmatic line or its MLM foundations [19].

Kaypakkaya's attitude under interrogation became the party's enduring standard of active resistance, openly declaring one's communist politics while refusing to confirm even those organizational facts the police already knew [20]. That the party later failed to educate its cadres systematically in this line of resistance, despite possessing Kaypakkaya's great legacy, was identified as a serious and consequential weakness [21]. More broadly, the party's inability to draw honest lessons from the defeat was itself a profound error. The idolization and tabulaization of Kaypakkaya, the habit of treating any criticism of his tactical errors as tantamount to rejecting him or abandoning the program, "importantly prevented us from finding and exposing the essential causes behind the 1973 defeat" [22]. This method of thought, which is called "cheap Kaypakkaya-ism," became a recurring pattern. The party produced "cheap martyr literature" rather than scientific accounting, and for twenty years it repeated itself as a consequence of this mental method [23][22].

IV. The Ideological Source of the Errors

At the fundamental theoretical level, the ideological source of all these errors was in subjectivism and their class basis in the petty bourgeoisie [24]. The cadres who formed the TKP(ML) came overwhelmingly from the anti-imperialist petty-bourgeois intellectual movement of the 1960s. Fifty years of revisionist dominance over the communist and revolutionary movement meant there was no Marxist-Leninist-Maoist heritage to lean on, and the young cadres' grasp of MLM was extremely shallow, while their burning hatred of rightism and passivism created fertile objective ground for "left" ideas [24]. Chairman Mao described the petty bourgeoisie's political tendency as a vacillation between right and left, rooted in one-sidedness and subjectivism of thought [25], and summarized the three fronts on which petty-bourgeois ideology appears, namely subjectivism in ideology, right and "left" deviations in politics, and sectarianism in organization [26]. This analytical method, which refuses to separate any political, organizational or military line from its ideological roots, constitutes the core theoretical lesson of the entire accounting, together with the dialectical point that those who err are virtuous precisely because they are inside the class struggle, whereas presenting a party

or its leadership as error-free belongs not to the MLM worldview but to the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois one [26].

V. The Coordination Committee Clique, the First Conference, and the First Central Committee

The post-defeat decades confirmed this diagnosis repeatedly. The Coordination Committee clique that took over after 1973 trampled the party's ideological, political and organizational line in a coupist-liquidationist manner, entering a course that rejected people's war [27]. Yet the struggle waged against it by the MLM cadres remained at the level of results, without grasping that the source of the liquidation was the failure to comprehend Maoism. The Coordination Committee's liquidationist character was not recognized in time, and its dismantling of the party's centralism was met with liberal tolerance [28]. The comrades who defended the Kaypakkaya line recentralized the party at the 1978 First Conference, an important success whose line was essentially correct. It approved Kaypakkaya's programmatic views, confirmed the semi-colonial, semi-feudal character of the country and the new-type bourgeois democratic stage of the revolution, assessed the revolutionary situation as high, and set the preparation and launching of peasant guerrilla war as the general task [29]. Yet the conference's source error was its rejection of the "Mao Zedong Thought" formulation [30], and neither the conference nor the First Central Committee it elected sufficiently analyzed the Coordination Committee clique's line to achieve a thorough rupture from it [31].

The First Central Committee (CC) (1978–81) then deviated openly from the party's military line. Instead of enriching and practicing the conference's essentially correct orientation, it invented a separate "Preparatory Period for Guerrilla War" as a stage in its own right, occupying the party with abstract and backward debates in order not to launch guerrilla war [32]. In practice the countryside was forgotten. In place of the strategy of the countryside encircling the city, a de facto strategy of the city encircling the countryside developed, individual armed actions in the cities were perceived as the party's understanding of armed struggle, and cadres were shaped accordingly. This was a clear deviation from the general strategic line, made worse by the fact that not a single guerrilla unit had yet been organized [33][31]. The bitter summary is that, except for the Kaypakkaya period, guerrilla war was always defended only in theory [8].

VI. The Second Conference and the Loss of Süleyman Cihan

The Second Conference of 1981 illustrated the same dialectic of advance and error. It correctly evaluated the Party of Labour of Albania in essentials, exposing the dogmato-revisionist sources of the PLA's attacks on Mao Zedong and the Chinese revolution [34][35], and it rejected the dominant erroneous line within the First CC that had attacked the New Democratic Revolution, people's power, socialism and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution [36]. But it erred gravely by continuing to defend the First Conference's rejection of the Mao Zedong Thought (MZT) formulation [37], by "suspending" Mao's teachings, which in effect meant suspending the theoretical

problems that constitute the party's political and ideological line [37], and by merely "suspending" rather than correcting the counter-revolutionary evaluation of the PKK, when the correct attitude was to recognize it as a revolutionary national movement (at the time). Nor did it expose the social-chauvinist influence marking the party's line on the Kurdish national question [38].

Most fatefully, its left-subjectivist political-tactical determinations, which underestimated the enemy, exaggerated the people's readiness, and ignored the weakness of the party's subjective forces, dispersed the party's forces adventurously into the cities and led it step by step toward the second organizational defeat. Party Secretary Süleyman Cihan and the captured CC and regional committee members were all caught in city centers as the direct product of this policy [39][40]. Cihan, the party's General Secretary, was captured and killed under torture following a wave of arrests that began with the breakdown of a Central Committee member elected at the Second Conference [40]. Of the twelve active CC members, seven fell into the enemy's hands within approximately four months of police operations and the breakdown of captured cadres, and three Political Bureau members were captured, including Cihan [41]. The Maoist party 1st congress documents state unambiguously that "the fundamental cause of comrade Süleyman Cihan's capture and killing was our own errors." The specific error was that the party secretary personally undertook tasks that many party members could have performed (such as clearing out a safe house and moving materials from one location to another), a failure rooted in "the absence of strategic leadership consciousness." Protecting the party secretary and ensuring his security was the entire party's problem, not his personal affair, yet this was not grasped [42]. The Second CC then compounded the error by failing to evaluate the causes of the organizational blows correctly, reducing them to "longing for the cities" and individual demoralization rather than the political line itself [43], while the urban military actions of the period served not to advance but to damage the party [44].

VII. The Prisons as a Front Where Line Proved Decisive

The prisons and torture chambers constituted another front where line proved decisive. In Diyarbakır Military Prison, surrender and resistance were lived intertwined, but the resistance line ultimately prevailed and stamped the process. The 1982 death fast, the self-immolation of the Four in May 1982, and the 1983 death fast successively raised the level of struggle, until by early 1986 the political and military sanctions had been abolished as a whole and in 1987 the single-type prison uniforms were thrown off. Remarkably, although the party constituted only about five percent of the prison population, it made up twenty-eight percent of the resisting mass, yet it failed to sufficiently own and politically generalize these resistances [45]. In Mamak Prison, by contrast, the forty-five-day hunger strike begun in March 1984 won only partial successes, and the surrender line was never broken by resistance, with the single-type uniform continuing to be worn until that prison closed [46]. The handling of the single-type uniform question condensed the whole problem of method. First a left and sharp determination was made, then wearing the uniform was defended and practiced with a

mass-tailist rationale. Leftism in one place and rightism in another were twin siblings of the same subjectivist and one-sided ideological root, aggravated by a petty-bourgeois arrogant refusal to deliver self-criticism [47][48].

VIII. The Mid-1980s Crisis, Kazım Çelik, and the 1987 Split

The pattern of failing to protect strategic leadership continued with Kazım Çelik, the party's third General Secretary. Çelik was the sole CC member present in the guerrilla zone during a period of deep military and organizational crisis in 1983–85, after the fall of the Regional Secretary responsible for military organization, Hayrettin Bakış [49]. When the CC decided to hold the conference abroad in Europe, a decision made without regard for the party's pulse after seven conference delegates had already fallen as martyrs in 1986, the fragile balance was pushed further into negativity [50]. Çelik and other cadres developed the Conference Organizing Committee (COC), but this was not accepted in the party, and those who advocated it withdrew their proposal to avoid a split [50]. Çelik fell as a martyr in May 1987 in Palu, together with five comrades [50]. The documents note that while Çelik was a leading cadre, the period under his leadership was marked by the CC's inability to produce correct policy, the failure to properly initiate guerrilla warfare, and a rightist line that limited actions to agents and collaborators rather than directly targeting the state [49]. The COC and the subsequent split reflected the party's inability to resolve its leadership crisis through correct two-line struggle, and the documents acknowledge Çelik's responsibility both in the COC organization and in the decision to abandon it right after [51].

The two wings into which the party divided in 1987 took their names from the organizational forms through which the crisis was fought out, and the clarification of each must be treated as the necessary starting point for evaluating the five years that followed. The separating wing took its name from the party's Eastern Anatolia Regional Committee (EARC), the regional structure in the Dersim-centered guerrilla zone, Region No. 1, around which the rebellion coalesced. The name itself carried the party's history: Kaypakkaya's February 1972 "EARC decision" had been the founding act of the break with Doğu Perinçek's revisionist TİİKP, while the First CC's practice of calling the oppressed nation's region the "Eastern Anatolia Regional Committee" rather than Kurdistan had itself been registered as a concession to social-chauvinist timidity [97][98]. The split's immediate background was the Second CC's right-liquidationist course after the second organizational defeat where cadres and members were drawn abroad as a refugee movement, guerrilla Region No. 1 was left leaderless, guerrilla warfare uninitiated, and the Third Conference, placed on the agenda by the Second Conference and first set for 1985, repeatedly postponed, most fatefully in the summer of 1986 on the pretext that those abroad in Europe were "not prepared" [99]. When nine comrades, among them seven conference delegates, fell in a clash with state forces at Hürmek on November 1986, the CC abandoned its 1984 decision to hold the conference in the countryside and resolved to convene it abroad, a decision that landed in a region where the replacement delegates and cadres had already organized a Provisional Regional Committee (PRC) and where the overwhelming majority of members were

drifting toward separation [99][101]. It was this soil that produced the COC approach and, after that proposal was withdrawn so that the party would not split and after Kazım Çelik fell at Palu in May 1987, the final break occurred [50]. The immediate occasion was the return of a guerrilla unit sent to the south, which declared that it did not find going to the conference correct, would not recognize it, and would not be bound by it; the two regional delegates still preparing to depart thereupon gave up the journey, while two others had already reached the conference site by way of the West, and Manuel Demir, the delegate elected in the West, who was tasked with persuading the EARC to attend the conference, though he held the split to be wrong, he ended up integrating with the region and sided with EARC [100]. In August–September 1987 the region's forces, including all cadres, members and fighters, held the meeting known in the party as "EARC's Extraordinary Regional Party Conference," elected a seven-person regional leading organ charged with re-centralizing the organization and convening a new conference, and in September 1987 publicly declared the organizational split through its conference report, announcing that it had "expelled the revisionist leadership from the party" [108][104]. EARC's "exit perspective" held that a conference attended together with the revisionists would not solve but aggravate the party's problems, that it would formalize the liquidation of the party's line, and that the revisionist CC therefore had to be immediately expelled from the party [105].

The opposing wing, which was the Conference wing (due to them wanting to hold a conference abroad), was formed by the overwhelming majority of the party's members and delegates, including those abroad and in the west, who attended the Third Conference convoked by the sitting CC. Against EARC's claim that a revisionist leadership had drawn the majority of members and cadres abroad and that these therefore could not represent the party's will, it must be stated that reducing membership to geography, to whether one was in the mountains, in the west or abroad, replaced Maoist organizational principles with regionalism and reduced communism to geographic conditions [102]. The documents record that the conference was even prepared to hand the party leadership over to the regional delegates, on the grounds that the bourgeoisie had never been seen to hand power to the proletariat of its own accord while the proletariat pushed it aside; EARC's answer was the call: "Going to the conference is bowing to the revisionists. Come back" [100]. The Third Conference elected a Third CC of seven full and two alternate members, together with five members elected from the prisons, of whom two declared for EARC and three for the Conference wing [103]. The wrong of the split was not in the EARC's grievances, for the separation was "not without reason," born of the distrust and chaos the right-liquidationist Second CC had created, but in its method. An open, rebellious, semi-anarchist raising of the banner against the conference and the sitting CC on the conference's eve, in place of two-line struggle on the conference platform, a method that must be judged anti-Maoist. EARC had acted openly as a regional organization, with the CC's knowledge and with the participation of General Secretary Kazım Çelik, and had generally observed party discipline until the split [101][106]. Against EARC's justification that the Second CC represented a "systematized revisionist line" with which no coexistence was possible, this characterization itself was subjective and sectarian, for the Second CC's line was right-

opportunist and liquidationist but not a systematized revisionist one, and even had the leadership been revisionist the only correct course remained Kaypakkaya's own. He had evaluated the TİİKP leadership as revisionist, yet fought two years inside the organization and sought the congress platform to proclaim his views, until the revisionists themselves blocked him [104][107].

The 1987 split and the parallel lines of the two wings deepened the lessons on unity and sectarianism. The Third Conference was legitimate, and EARC's declaration of organizational split on its eve was a wrong method that the First Congress later ideologically condemned [52][53]. The Third Conference was MLM in essentials, defending the universal principles of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism and the party's programmatic views [53]. Its defense of the MZT formulation was a positive development [54], and its policy toward EARC, which approached the question with responsibility and patience and made the persuasion and re-winning of the separated fighters the first and most important task, was correct [54]. Yet it handled the People's United Front question in Doğu Perinçek's manner rather than Kaypakkaya's, an open opportunism [54], and the thesis that the front could be built before red political powers existed revealed a failure to understand how the revolution would actually occur and which class and party would lead the front [55]. Its evaluation of the PKK as counter-revolutionary at the time was wrong and was maintained even after the PKK had corrected the negative features that had originally motivated the assessment [56]. The Third CC then deviated from the party's general political line by determining that "the national contradiction is the principal contradiction" for Northern Kurdistan. This was a right deviation that created the theoretical-political basis for separate organization [57]. Meanwhile the Fourth Conference condemned "sectionism" in words without ever touching the ideological roots of these errors [57].

On the other wing, EARC neither grasped nor valued mass work, militia organization, propaganda and agitation, limiting itself even in Dersim to a few districts and some villages. The consciousness that revolution is the work of the masses, that the fundamental principle of Protracted People's War is mass ties, and that people's war is the war of the people rather than of the vanguard, was weak [58]. Looking at every question from the barrel of a gun, EARC dreamed that once the guns fired everything would fall into place, and the military successes of 1991 intoxicated its cadres, pushing the purely military viewpoint to its peak. The party's importance was belittled within the army, party representatives were treated as obstacles, and the formula "commissars are rightists, commanders are leftists" emerged [58][59].

No figure embodies the tragedy of the purely military viewpoint more completely than Baba Erdoğan, the communist leader who emerged as the "natural leader" of the EARC wing after the 1987 split. Care has to be taken in establishing the terms of the criticism from the outset. No one can criticize the communism of Comrade Baba or of those martyred like him. He was a great communist who possessed the qualities of a communist leader [118][115]. Yet precisely because of his stature, his trajectory demonstrates how an erroneous line, not personal failing, destroys even the most valuable cadres. Communist leadership is not exhausted by courage and self-sacrifice;

leadership means foreseeing the future, making not short- but long-term calculations, determining policy appropriate to the concrete situation and instilling it in the organization. It means maturing in the political, ideological, organizational and military fields alike. Baba Erdoğan had a series of deficiencies and inadequacies in this regard, and it was these, combined with the negative line dominant in his organization, that dragged him and dozens of communist leaders like him into untimely actions in a hasty manner and then to martyrdom [115].

The Kandıra barracks raid of January 1988, led by Baba Erdoğan, is the first case study. Everyone knew of the action; it was militarily successful, and the political message it delivered to the organization, the party base and the revolutionary masses was enormous and indisputable. But when the organizational dimension is examined, the reality is nothing like the exaggerations: the party had until that day always highlighted only this positive side and made politics over it, never condemning the line of the action or the negativities it produced [114]. First, within a few days of the action's completion, every participant except one fell into the enemy's hands in the ensuing operation—Baba Erdoğan was captured alive while Manuel Demir was executed in the street immediately upon capture, meaning that EARC's most experienced leading cadres, both militarily and politically, were neutralized by the enemy in a single blow [114]. Second, the action exposed that the Istanbul organization was hollow and lacked the quality to bear such an action; it collapsed under a light blow. EARC could not see that this had to be evaluated as a restraining factor, because the organization was mentally ready for armed action but organizationally unready and when an organization collapses under an action, the correct course is to postpone that action; the contrary understanding and practice, as in the Kandıra raid, loses both organizationally and militarily [116]. The consequences cascaded: in March 1988, only two or three months after the raid and the organizational blows that followed it, EARC leader Seyfi Batar fell martyr in Diyarbakır together with two comrades, Metin Kaya fell in a clash in Dersim, and the EARC secretary was captured two months later, so that within barely six months of the split, five of the cadres elected to the leading body at the regional conference were either martyred or captured, leaving only two [115][119]. It was precisely into this decimated leadership that professional state agent Nihat (Enver Doğru) was elevated [119].

The purely military viewpoint then reproduced itself at a higher level in the dispersal of forces after 1991. Although the decision taken was one of "expanding by concentrating" or "advancing by concentrating," in practice the opposite was done. Intoxicated by victory, a tendency to swing fists in all directions at once developed, and before proper ties had been established even with Dersim's districts and villages, the qualitatively and quantitatively weak guerrilla forces were scattered with "grasshopper tactics" to Central Anatolia, the Eastern Black Sea and the Amed region, preparing the ground for organizational and military blows. The most select leaders and commanders such as Seyfi Batar, Hasan Toy, Baba Erdoğan, İsmail Bulut, Doğan Karadağ, all lost their lives as the product of this adventurist policy, and the loss was not limited to the comrades themselves but caused the political and ideological level of the party to fall [122]. Comrade Baba's own assignment expressed the same logic, at the first CC meeting he attended, the decision was taken to open up to the Black Sea region and Baba was

appointed to head the organization there; in August 1990 a guerrilla unit under his command set foot in Central Anatolia with very few forces, and thus his slogan “One Dersim Is Not Enough, the Target Must Be a Thousand Dersims” came to life in practice [113]. His assignment to the Black Sea was not correct, and that the same purely military viewpoint appeared in other CC appointments as well, for instance, the removal of a CC member whose activities in the General Command were unsuccessful and his appointment to the Political Bureau showed that the Political Bureau, which is supposed to lead the party ideologically and politically, was regarded as less important than the General Command; the underlying consciousness failed to see the Political Bureau as the body that directs and guides the war and thereby the revolution, while charging the General Command with the mission of directing the revolution and the war [109].

The Gömelönü police station attack, in which Comrade Baba fell, condenses the entire problem into a single point. Even had the action ended successfully, the essential truth would not change. One error was that Comrade Baba personally took part in it, at a time when he was supposed to be present at a CC meeting to be held shortly afterward, such risky actions should not have been undertaken on the eve of so serious a meeting. That a leading cadre, indeed the natural leader of EARC, stood at the head of such an action cannot be evaluated independently of the left-opportunist line EARC was following; because that line bore the heavy influence of the purely military viewpoint, protecting leading cadres was impossible, for according to this line the best leader is the cadre who carries out the biggest actions, running from action to action with gun in hand. Comrade Baba himself was under the influence of this line, and it was one of the factors that pushed him, despite all the disadvantages, not to think long-term and into this action; another important factor was the pressure created by EARC’s inability to carry out a serious guerrilla attack after its Third Conference [110]. Did anyone directly ask Baba Erdoğan to carry out such an action? No, but the left line that pushed him there existed, the understanding of “always forward, never stopping, always attack, never retreat” governed this practice, and even walking a cautious line, let alone stopping or retreating, was evaluated in the party as right-opportunism [118]. The end of this historical period was the darkest page of all. As revealed during Operation Snowdrop (an initiative to crackdown on the counter-revolutionary cell that had infiltrated the party ranks, primarily formed of state collaborators as well as professional agents), Comrade Baba was shot during the attack by the state agent Nihat, who was inside the guerrilla unit, and although there were possibilities to rescue him afterward, he was not rescued and fell martyr, the person bearing first-degree responsibility both for his being shot and for his being left to die untreated was the state agent Nihat [113]. The purely military viewpoint thus did not merely expose leading cadres to risk; by dissolving organizational discipline, report systems and security procedures, it created the very environment in which enemy infiltration flourished, for in this period no report system was operated in admitting members to the party or fighters to the army, countless dubious elements were packed into party and army ranks on the references of various “chiefs,” in a feudal manner and not even a serious archive was kept of who joined, how, and through whom [117].

Comrade Baba's case could be framed explicitly within Chairman Mao's 1929 analysis of the purely military viewpoint in the Red Army, observing that Mao's theses read as if they had been written for EARC. These comrades regard military matters and politics as opposites and refuse to admit that military action is only one of the means for accomplishing political tasks; some even say "if you are good militarily you are good politically, if you are not good militarily you are no good politically", which is to go a step further and place military matters above politics. They think the task of the Red Army, like that of the White army, is merely to fight, not understanding that the Red Army is an armed body for carrying out the political tasks of the revolution, that besides fighting to destroy the enemy's military strength it must shoulder such important tasks as propaganda among the masses, organizing and arming them, helping them establish revolutionary political power and setting up party organizations, and that without these aims fighting loses its meaning and the Red Army its reason for existence [111][124]. And those who disregard subjective and objective conditions are struck by the disease of revolutionary impetuosity, unwilling to take the trouble of painstaking and detailed work among the masses, they float in dreams and want only to accomplish great deeds, it is a remnant of putschism [112]. This is why it must be insisted that the success of a military line must be evaluated not by how many military engagements occurred, how many ambushes laid, how many actions carried out, but by whether the political tasks of the revolution, that is, propaganda and agitation, organizing and arming the masses, establishing popular party committees, assisting party organization within the army and militia organization, were successfully fulfilled; where a correct ideological viewpoint and a military line following in its footsteps are absent, even thousands of guerrilla actions a day cannot be made permanent, for in revolution it is not weapons and technique but the conscious dynamic role of human beings that is decisive [123].

The final lesson to draw is about the atmosphere this line created and protected itself with. The purely military viewpoint that became dominant in EARC and enveloped its cadres exacted heavy prices by preventing the institutionalization of ideological, political and organizational leadership and thereby the party's successful direction of the revolution and the revolutionary war; within EARC there were many comrades who did not understand or grasp that the people's army is an armed force for fulfilling the political tasks of the revolution [111]. The military successes of 1991 positively intoxicated EARC's cadres and carried the purely military viewpoint to its peak; the party's importance was belittled within the army ranks, party representatives and party members in the guerrilla units were regarded almost as stumbling blocks and despised, sectarianism flourished boundlessly in organizational relations, organizational principles were trampled [120]. Throughout its five-year history EARC never grasped the decisive importance of leadership; the cadres appointed to the Political Bureau were constantly belittled and even exposed among the fighter mass on the grounds that "they do nothing, they are rightists," the conditions for the Political Bureau to perform its own task were never created, and it was "desired" that the Political Bureau lead the party politically and ideologically while conducting activity in the villages like an ordinary guerrilla under the supervision of an ordinary commander [121]. And when errors corresponding to this line were pointed out, especially in EARC ranks before 1995, the discussion of the question

was blocked by resorting to many forms of blackmail, including the threat of splitting [112]. Comrade Baba's life and death therefore stand as the human measure of an abstract deviation, a great communist leader, pushed by a line that defined leadership as leading the biggest action with gun in hand, scattered across regions by "grasshopper tactics," denied the protection that a correct line owes its leading cadres, and finally delivered, through the organizational porosity that the same line created, into the hands of an enemy agent. The purely military viewpoint, does not merely fail to make revolution; it consumes the revolution's most precious assets, its leaders, and calls the consumption heroism.

IX. Unity and Split, 1992–94, and the Loss of Cüneyt Kahraman

The 1992 organizational unity between EARC and Conference wings, realized based on the 1972 program, and the 1994 split that followed, demonstrated that formal unity without ideological-political clarity merely postpones and deepens crisis [60][61]. The Temporary Regional Central Committee period, created as a result of the unification, was marked by spontaneity. There was no intervention in the political agenda, no tactical policies, and the duties toward the Kurdish national movement were left unfulfilled, its revolutionary aspects unsupported [62]. The Extraordinary Party Conference (EPC) elected a Central Committee constituted as a coalition of groups, an opportunist leadership of a bourgeois liberal character that gathered every alien ideological current under its roof, preserved a verbal unity while creating the ideological, political and organizational basis for bigger splits, and lived off the credit that the noble cause of "the unity of the Maoists" had created among the party and the masses [63]. Among the EPC's correct decisions were the treatment of parliamentarism as a tactical rather than principled question, the defense of the People's United Front as Kaypakkaya had formulated it, the embrace of the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement's Declaration and the declaration Long Live Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, and Decision 26, which upheld the Maoism formulation as expressing Mao's qualitative contributions more clearly [61][64][65]. But the importance of leadership was not grasped and was trivialized, exemplified by the wrong policy of settling the entire Political Bureau in the countryside [66]. The purely military viewpoint dominated this whole period, and the state infiltrator agent NT's later boast that "if not for the military actions I had carried out after the EPC, the party would not exist today" can only be read as the confession of a line that looks at matters not ideologically and politically but from the muzzle of the gun [67]. The 1994 split's fundamental cause was precisely this left-sectarian line dominant before and after the unity, with the main responsibility borne by the Extraordinary Party Organization clique and a secondary share by the Military Commission clique, while counter-revolutionary cell elements also played a special role [68].

The case of Cüneyt Kahraman, the party's Fourth General Secretary, exemplifies the failure of strategic leadership at the level of personal conduct and organizational culture. Kahraman fell as a martyr on March 15, 1997, during an ambush by state forces using tanks equipped with thermal cameras [69]. Prior to becoming General Secretary, he was

a Military Commission member responsible for logistics, where he should have focused on his primary duty. Instead, he "ran from action to action" with the guerrilla unit under his supervision, was seriously wounded in one of these actions, and was rendered unable to perform his duties for two years [67]. This is the manifestation of the purely military viewpoint that rejected the logic of peasant guerrilla warfare developing "from the small to the large, from the simple to the complex, from the weak to the strong" [67]. The investigation into his death revealed multiple errors. Due to his unit's erratic movement patterns, it was impossible to locate the source of the information leak to the enemy. Despite the possibility of evacuating the wounded from the ambush, they were not removed from the combat zone, a failure attributed to the unit commander's "panic and selfish conduct" and constituting a war crime [69]. The General Secretary's pistol was not left with him despite his request [69]. More broadly, the leadership itself "lacked leadership consciousness and representational power" and "behaved as if it were ordinary fighters" [70]. The Political Bureau personally participated in armed actions, even claiming one in the name of the "PB Military Unit," and could not see the wrongness of using the very unit tasked with protecting the PB for such actions [67][70]. When the General Secretary requested fighters for his security, they were not provided in time, endangering his life. This was "another form of the politics of not taking leadership seriously and not valuing it, which has existed since the past" [70]. In the guerrilla zone where the PB was stationed, even militia and courier resources were not provided, PB had to facilitate basic functions on their own, "a striking indicator of how seriously the leadership was taken" [66].

X. The Final Period from the 1994 Split to the Mercan Massacre

In the final period, from the 1994 split to the mid-2000s, there were no qualitative difference between the lines followed after the split and the opportunist lines of the past. The same right or, generally, left lines continued to dominate, because no thorough MLM ideological rupture from them had been achieved [71]. The mass line was destroyed to a significant degree, for when the organization is used as an aim rather than a means, ideological degeneration has already begun [72], and the purely military viewpoint of the past was preserved and continued [23]. The Congress Preparation Conference correctly set a one-year plan for the successful completion of Operation Snowdrop, but erred by treating the operation only in its military dimension instead of placing the ideological and political dimension at the center [73], and it acted sectarianly toward the vacillating members labeled the "liquidationist clique," failing to work patiently to persuade them [74]. Its decision to convene the party's First Congress in 1999 was subjective, since the Central Committee lacked the capacity and the MLM line to realize a congress worthy of the name after more than twenty-five years. Replacing the congress with a Central Conference was therefore the most correct policy under the circumstances [75]. That 1999 Central Conference's decisions on members who had not or could not attend were essentially negative. Memberships were dropped without seeing the party's own errors, double standards were applied, and comrades were tried and expelled in a sectarian manner [76]. On the other end of the 1994 split, evaluating the

TKP/ML's (not to be confused with - TKP(ML) -) post-split line as a whole, it can be concluded that in the political, military and organizational fields it was not MLM but left-sectarian and adventurist. Behind the failures lay the refusal to evaluate both the past and the concrete situation with dialectical and historical materialism, the guidance of subjective dogmatism and narrow empiricism, and the habit of putting means before ends, going as far as in the slogan adopted by TKP/ML, "everything is for the party" [77]. Its policy toward the TKP(ML) and later when it became MKP, was likewise sectarian and destructive [78]. Yet the decisive reason the party and the guerrilla activity were not liquidated, despite these opportunist lines and the counter-revolution's intense efforts from without and within, was the abiding trust in the TKP(ML)'s general ideological-political line and the great sacrifice with which countless cadres, members and fighters embraced the party [70].

The massacre of the "17s", the architects of the 1st Congress of the MKP, at Mercan Valley in 2005 represents the culmination of these accumulated failures. On June 17, 2005, as the party was preparing for its Second Congress, the enemy launched a strategic annihilation and encirclement operation in which seventeen leading cadres, members, and fighters, including the entirety of the PB, were killed, including General Secretary Cafer Cangöz and Deputy Secretary Aydın Hanbayat [79]. The Second Congress documents identify the loss as "one of the most important losses in party history" and insist that it must be analyzed "in all its ideological-political-organizational-military aspects in a scientific way," because otherwise "the ground that causes these errors to be repeated cannot be eliminated" [79]. This is also the point in history which marked the beginning of the liquidation of the People's War effort in Turkey-North Kurdistan. The organizational causes included moving through organizational channels known to the enemy, choosing a weaker area as the congress site, cadres collectively and simultaneously leaving their activity areas to go to the congress, extensive use of mobile and landline phones in congress activities, collective farewells and organizational decipher that exposed the congress to wide circles, legal and illegal areas operating together, and insistence on using a location in the same area despite the congress site having been compromised [80]. The military causes included the use of a limited security force, collective transport of cadres with this insufficient force, movement in unsuitable terrain, and failure to properly position guerrilla forces to intervene in the case of an emergency [80]. The political cause was subjectivism, that is, making assessments "ahead of objective reality" and overestimating the party's own strength [81]. The documents are emphatic. "The blow we received entirely because of the subjectivism we fell into is not a loss in the form of fate or the inevitable. If the party had seen the enemy's attacks and taken precautions, if it had not underestimated the enemy, if it had planned and acted according to its own strength, it could have passed all these attacks with few losses" [81].

XI. The Lessons of 1972–2005

Underlying all these specific failures is the party's own assessment that, "except for the Kaypakkaya period, the leaderships brought to office from the party's founding to the 1st

Congress, did not possess a Marxist-Leninist-Maoist quality and such a leadership capacity" [4]. Where there is no institutionalized strategic leadership, the party cannot be directed on a correct line and is quickly driven into deeper chaos and crises, "and this is what has been experienced throughout party history" [4]. The documents define strategic leadership as "determining." It is the center that manages the entire war, comprehending the functioning, policy, and practice of all parts both individually and in their interrelations, and giving direction [82]. It must be like an "orchestra conductor" who, taking into account the reality of the whole, the totality of the parts' relations, and the entirety of historical, social, and political conditions, applies strategy in every concrete situation and sets the whole in motion [82]. Without ideological-political strategic leadership, partial successes in individual areas and individual battles are possible, but "the sole guarantee of the success of a long-term strategic struggle is this strategic leadership itself" [83]. The failure to institutionalize such leadership, to create its conditions, its instruments, and its continuity, and to protect it, meant that the party's leadership was repeatedly thrown into the hottest arenas of struggle, making the greatest sacrifices, yet unable to fulfill its essential mission of providing ideological and political direction [84]. The greatest loss was the fact that, in thirty years, "the ideological, political, organizational, and military lines were not established, and the strategic leadership that is their representative power was not guaranteed" [1].

The ideological and class roots of these errors were identified as subjectivism, fed by the petit-bourgeois social composition of the party's cadres [25]. The majority of cadres who formed TKP(ML) came from the anti-imperialist petit-bourgeois intellectual movement of the 1960s, and their grasp of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism was "quite shallow" [24]. The communist movement in Turkey had been under revisionist domination for fifty years, leaving no MLM heritage for new cadres to learn from [24]. The thinking methods that predominated were dogmatism among the urban petit-bourgeoisie and narrow empiricism among the rural petit-bourgeoisie, both forms of subjectivism that failed to apply dialectical and historical materialism [85]. The party oscillated between not protecting the leadership at all and, in the name of protection, removing it from its essential tasks, failing to grasp the dialectic that "the essential thing is not protection but ideological-political leadership" [66].

At the most fundamental theoretical level, then, the lessons of 1972–2005 reduce to several interconnected propositions. First, the correctness or incorrectness of the ideological and political line decides everything. The congress documents quote Chairman Mao's teaching that if the line is wrong, defeat is inevitable even for those who control the army, whereas if the line is correct, those without a single soldier will take power. Kaypakkaya's complementary insistence was that with a correct policy, even a very limited organization can enter armed struggle and expand, consolidate and spread its forces within it [86]. Second, people's war is not a simple military line and cannot be reduced to the formula "the countryside encircles the cities." It is the general strategy and political line of the New Democratic Revolution and Socialist Revolution, the theory of seizing countrywide power by building red political powers under the leadership of a Maoist party, with base areas and red political powers as its fundamental elements and guerrilla war as the means to create them. Any revolutionary strategy not proceeding

from the perspective of liberated areas and red political powers cannot be considered a real people's war [87]. Third, people's war is above all the war of the masses. It carries the masses to power by transforming their lives and consciousness within the war and making them an organized political force, and it is simultaneously an ideological, political and cultural revolutionary process. This is precisely what the purely military viewpoint, the persistent deviation running from the urban-actions line of 1978–81 through EARC's 1991 intoxication of military successes to the post-1994 period, could never grasp [58][59][67]. Fourth, every political error has ideological and class roots, and only by tracing deviations to its ideological and social basis can a party avoid repeating them [25][26]. Fifth, the question of leadership is strategic. For decades leadership was neither strategically grasped nor established, and its trivialization exacted a heavy price [88][66]. Sixth, unity cannot be built on sectarianism or group bargaining. The splits of 1987 and 1994, and the wasted unity efforts between them, stand as negative lessons in the handling of inner-party struggle [89][68][90]. Seventh, resistance under torture and in the prisons is a matter of principle that must be systematically taught, not merely praised [20][21][91][92]. And eighth, the ideological line on Maoism itself was decisive. The First Conference's rejection of the MZT formulation was the source error whose damage could not be rooted out for years [30][93], while the later adoption of the Maoism formulation and the embrace of the RIM documents, albeit with its own errors, marked the ideological recovery that made the MKP's First Congress possible [65][64].

The lessons drawn by the party's congresses are therefore centered on the necessity of building a continuous, collective, institutionalized strategic leadership, one that is ideologically and politically equipped, protected from the enemy's annihilation operations, and capable of producing correct policy by scientifically analyzing concrete conditions. A Communist Party must "immediately organize around the central leadership" and carry out organizational activities through top-down central intervention and supervision within the framework of democratic centralism [94]. The leadership must not be risked for short-term tactical successes, and its collective working conditions must be created [95]. Above all, the party must break with the method of tabulaization and "cheap martyr literature" and instead conduct scientific accounting of every loss, every defeat, and every error, because, as the documents insist, "the revolution needs not people who do not make errors, but people who make errors and correct them" [2][23].

XII. Conclusion

The people's war will take entirely its own specific forms for each country, because there can be no copy revolutions and revolutions cannot be imported. Had China crudely repeated the Soviet model, there would have been no Chinese revolution [96]. People's war is not merely guerrilla activity nor simply a rural positioning. The countryside, the cities, the prisons, work abroad, the international arena, local administrations, unions, cooperatives, mass movements are all fronts of the people's war struggle for communism, to be coordinated under the central task, and the focoist and spontaneist lines must be definitively broken with [96]. The ultimate verdict of the 1972–2005

historical accounting is therefore not that the people's war strategy failed in Turkey, but that it was never yet carried through with the correct ideological-political line it demands. The errors of subjectivist situation assessments, the inversion of city and countryside, the suspension of Mao's teachings, the purely military viewpoint, the destruction of the mass line, sectarian splits, and the trivialization of leadership all sprang from one root, the petty-bourgeois subjectivism that evaluates reality as one wishes it to be rather than as it is [15][24]. To have named that root scientifically, and to have condemned the erroneous lines without condemning the heroic struggle of the cadres, fighters and prisoners who embodied the party's communist dynamism [70], is the enduring contribution of this accounting.

The history of the People's War in Turkey, from Kaypakkaya, Cihan, Çelik, Kahraman to Cangöz, the seventeen of Mercan Valley, is thus a history of correct strategic foundations repeatedly undermined by the failure to build and protect the leadership capable of carrying those foundations through the protracted and uneven course of revolutionary war. Each loss was paid for in the same currency of subjectivism, adventurism, and the absence of strategic leadership consciousness, and each time, the party's inability to draw honest lessons ensured that the same errors would recur. The congress documents, especially the 1st Congress in 2002, represented the party's attempt, however belated, to break this cycle through scientific self-criticism and the conscious construction of institutionalized leadership.

Note on the Citations

Turkish titles are given with an English gloss. All citations are numbered [1]–[124].

Cited Sources

- *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi)* [Maoist Communist Party First Congress Documents, "From the TKP(ML) to the Maoist Communist Party. This History Is Ours!" (The Historical Accounting)].
- *Maoist Komünist Partisi II. Kongre Belgeleri* [Maoist Communist Party Second Congress Documents].
- *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "İdeoloji: Marksizm-Leninizm-Maoizm"* [Maoist Communist Party First Congress Documents, "Ideology: Marxism-Leninism-Maoism"].
- *İbrahim Kaypakkaya, Seçme Yazılar / Selected Works* [İbrahim Kaypakkaya, Selected Works].

References

[1] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 465 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). Over

500 martyrs, yet a position 'quite backward' relative to the price paid. The failure to establish the ideological-political-organizational-military lines and to guarantee strategic leadership is identified as the greatest loss of thirty years.

[2] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 12 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). Founding of the TKP(ML) on 24 April 1972 in the Kürecik mountains as defender and qualitative re-creation of Mustafa Suphi's TKP. Also the motto 'the revolution needs not people who never make mistakes, but people who make mistakes and correct them'.

[3] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 9 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). Earlier leaderships evaluated the party's history eclectically, 'sometimes from the left, sometimes from the right', instead of drawing correct lessons from errors.

[4] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 88 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). 'Except for the Kaypakkaya period, the leaderships brought to office from the party's founding to the present did not possess a Marxist-Leninist-Maoist quality and such a leadership capacity'. Without an institutionalized strategic leadership the party is driven into deeper chaos and crises.

[5] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 22 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). Kaypakkaya systematized the TKP(ML)'s theoretical views in 'General Critique', 'Kemalism' and 'The National Question in Turkey', continuing the TİİKP Draft Programme Critique and 'Let Us Grasp Correctly Chairman Mao's Red Political Power Doctrine'.

[6] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 15 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). Kaypakkaya's writings systematizing the party's views. The April 1971 theses held rural activity primary, armed struggle principal, strategic defense essential, and village guerrilla warfare as the form of struggle in strategic defense.

[7] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 23 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). Programmatic theses holding that the essence of the democratic revolution is a land revolution based on the poor peasantry and that the rule of the ruling classes has been fascist from the very beginning.

[8] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 51 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). The contradiction between feudalism and the broad masses is the principal contradiction, and the soft underbelly of imperialism and its lackeys is the countryside. 'Except for the Kaypakkaya period, we always defended guerrilla war only in theory'.

[9] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 114 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). The big cities are under imperialism's control, the strategic reasoning for encircling the cities from the countryside.

[10] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 78 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). Kaypakkaya laid down not only the correct political line but a correct military line

encompassing guerrilla warfare and the nature and tasks of the army. Also discusses the erroneous city-actions line of 1978–81.

[11] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 420 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). Kaypakkaya's programmatic views as the scientific application of Maoism to the conditions of Turkey and Northern Kurdistan.

[12] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 54 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). Kaypakkaya stated that 'it should have been stated that our movement is the product of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution'.

[13] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 35 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). The 12 March period saw temporary stability among the ruling classes under parliamentarist-masked open fascism (the semi-military fascist dictatorship).

[14] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 35–36 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). The revolutionary wave was, at least temporarily, in retreat. The newly founded party had not yet established relations between regions and its mass ties were weak.

[15] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 38 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). 'We evaluated reality not as it was, but as we wished it to be'. The burning desire to break the chain of passivism and take up arms immediately was substituted for objective reality.

[16] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 36 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). The 1972 situation assessment tactically underestimated the enemy's forces and exaggerated the revolutionary forces, 'a grave error'. The revolutionary wave was in retreat and the central task should have been the party's construction and congress. The premature armed actions in Dersim made the party the prime target.

[17] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 26 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). The first year's actions were individual guerrilla actions, and the planned, organized launch of guerrilla war was deferred to after the congress.

[18] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 30 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). First martyrs Meral Yakar (21 January 1973), Ali Haydar Yıldız (24 January 1973), Ahmet Muharrem Çiçek (19 March 1973), and finally Kaypakkaya (May 1973). The First Organizational Defeat is dated to the collapse of the Istanbul region, not to Kaypakkaya's capture.

[19] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 39 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). The 1973 defeat was a tactical-political, not a strategic or ideological, defeat. The general political line was correct, Marxist-Leninist-Maoist.

[20] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 193 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). Active resistance is defined as refusing to confirm even organizational facts the police

already knows while openly declaring one's communist politics. This was Kaypakkaya's attitude under interrogation.

[21] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 199 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). The party was not made ideologically and politically prepared for resistance under torture, and no special education was given despite possessing Kaypakkaya's brilliant legacy.

[22] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 41 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). The idolization and tabulaization of Kaypakkaya 'importantly prevented us from finding and exposing the essential causes behind the 1973 defeat'. For twenty years the party repeated itself through this method.

[23] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 464 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). 'Cheap Kaypakkaya-ism' and 'cheap martyr literature' instead of scientific accounting. Also the preservation and continuation of the purely military viewpoint after the 1994 split.

[24] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 37 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). The ideological and class source of the errors was subjectivism and the petty bourgeoisie. The cadres came from the 1960s anti-imperialist petty-bourgeois intellectual movement, fifty years of revisionist dominance left no MLM heritage, and the young cadres' grasp of MLM was shallow.

[25] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 42 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). Mao on the petty bourgeoisie, whose political tendency vacillates between right and left, rooted in one-sidedness and subjectivism of thought. Subjectivism as the ideological source of the errors, the petty bourgeoisie as its social-class basis.

[26] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 43 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). The three fronts of petty-bourgeois ideology are subjectivism in ideology, right and 'left' deviations in politics, and sectarianism in organization. 'Those who err are virtuous, for they are inside the class struggle', and presenting a party as error-free belongs to the bourgeois worldview.

[27] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 49 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). The KK clique trampled the party's ideological, political and organizational line in a coupist-liquidationist manner.

[28] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 48 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). The errors of the MLM cadres were that the KK's liquidationist character was not recognized in time and its liquidation of the party's centrism was tolerated with liberalism.

[29] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 66 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). The 1978 First Conference approved the programmatic views, assessed the revolutionary situation as high, and set the preparation and launching of peasant guerrilla war as the general task.

[30] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 55 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). The First Conference's source error was its ideological failure to defend Mao Zedong Thought, thereby deviating from Maoism.

[31] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 61 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). Neither the First Conference nor the First MK sufficiently analyzed the KK clique's line to achieve a thorough rupture from it.

[32] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 68 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). The First MK invented the 'Preparatory Period for Guerrilla War' as a period in its own right.

[33] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 50 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). The countryside was forgotten, and in place of 'the countryside encircles the city' a de facto strategy of 'the city encircles the countryside' developed.

[34] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 118 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). The AEP concentrates its attack on Marxism-Leninism in the person of Mao Zedong, hiding behind sharp 'Stalinist' poses.

[35] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 119 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). The Second Conference's AEP evaluation (Decision No. 9) held that the AEP's line is a modern revisionist-Trotskyist mixture.

[36] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 104 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). The Second Conference determined that the Abroad (YD) line had fundamentally deviated from the party line on the minimum programme.

[37] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 120–121 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). The Second Conference's 'suspension' of Mao's teachings and its fundamental deficiency, namely that it still defended the First Conference's rejection of the 'Mao Zedong Thought' formulation (Decision No. 5 and its assessment).

[38] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 130 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). The Second Conference merely 'suspended' the counter-revolutionary evaluation of the PKK and did not expose the social-chauvinist influence in the party's line on the Kurdish national question.

[39] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 333 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). The Second Conference and its MK as the 'chief architects' of the organizational blow. Party Secretary Süleyman Cihan and all captured MK and Regional Committee members were caught in city centers as the product of this policy.

[40] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 150 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). The wave of arrests beginning with the breakdown of an MK member elected at the Second Conference, in which seven MK members were captured.

[41] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 192 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). Of the twelve active MK members, seven fell into the enemy's hands within about four months, and three Political Bureau members, including General Secretary Süleyman Cihan, were captured.

[42] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 149 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). 'The fundamental cause of comrade Süleyman Cihan's capture and killing was our own errors'. The party secretary personally undertook tasks many members could have performed, which reflected the absence of strategic leadership consciousness. Protecting the secretary is the party's problem.

[43] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 159 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). The Second MK reduced the causes of the organizational blows to 'longing for the cities' and individual demoralization rather than the political line itself.

[44] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 154 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). The urban military actions of the period served the party's disadvantage, since 'in this period resorting to offensive military actions in the cities was not in the party's favour but against it, and battered it'.

[45] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 209 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). In Diyarbakır, the 1982 death fast, the self-immolation of the Four in May 1982, and the 1983 death fast successively raised the struggle. By early 1986 the political and military sanctions were abolished, and in 1987 the single-type uniforms were thrown off. Five percent of the prison population made up twenty-eight percent of the resisting mass, yet the resistances were not sufficiently owned.

[46] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 211 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). In Mamak, the forty-five-day hunger strike begun in March 1984 won only partial successes. The single-type uniform continued to be worn until the prison closed, and the surrender line was never transformed into resistance.

[47] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 221 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). On the single-type uniform question, first a left-sharp determination was made, then wearing it was defended with a mass-tailist rationale. Leftism in one place and rightism in another were twin siblings.

[48] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 222 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). The ideological root of the uniform errors was subjectivism and one-sidedness, and the refusal to give self-criticism was petty-bourgeois arrogance.

[49] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 176 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). Kazım Çelik as the sole MK member in the guerrilla zone after the fall of Hayrettin Bakış. The period's rightist line limited actions to agents and collaborators rather than directly targeting the state.

[50] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 170 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). The decision to hold the conference abroad despite seven delegates falling as martyrs in 1986, the KÖK (Conference Organizing Committee) episode, and the death of Kazım Çelik with five comrades at Palu in May 1987.

[51] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 324 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). Kazım Çelik's responsibility both in the KÖK organization and in the decision to abandon it.

[52] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 230 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). 'Our Third Conference is legitimate'.

[53] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 234 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). DABK's declaration of organizational split on the eve of the Third Conference was wrong. The Third Conference defends the universal principles of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism and the party's programmatic views. It is MLM in essentials.

[54] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 249 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). The Third Conference's defense of the MZD formulation as a positive development, and its policy of persuading and re-winning the DABK fighters as correct. Its handling of the People's United Front question in Doğu Perinçek's manner, however, was open opportunism.

[55] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 248 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). The thesis that the People's United Front could be built before red political powers existed revealed a failure to understand how the revolution would occur.

[56] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 271 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). The Third MK maintained the 'counter-revolutionary' assessment of the PKK for three years even after the PKK had corrected its negative features.

[57] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 282 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). The Third MK's determination that 'the national contradiction is the principal contradiction' for Northern Kurdistan was a deviation even the Revolutionary Partisans never made. The Fourth Conference condemned 'sectionism' in words without touching the ideological roots. Politics and tactics are the lifeline of a party.

[58] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 359 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). DABK's weak mass work was limited even in Dersim to a few districts and villages. The purely military viewpoint at its peak meant party representatives were treated as obstacles and the formula 'commissars are rightists, commanders are leftists' emerged.

[59] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 367 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). The military successes of 1991 brought a non-negligible victory-intoxication into DABK's ranks.

[60] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 490 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). The 1992 unity was realized under a liberal-opportunist policy. Also the origins of the 1994 split.

[61] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 414 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). The 1992 unity of the TKP(ML) forces was realized on the basis of the 1972 programme. Decision 26 preferred the Maoism formulation as expressing Mao's qualitative contributions more clearly.

[62] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 412 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). The GBMK period saw no intervention in the political agenda and no tactical policies, and the duties toward the Kurdish national movement were left unfulfilled.

[63] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 428 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). The OPK-elected Central Committee as a coalition of groups, a bourgeois-liberal opportunist leadership that created the ideological, political and organizational basis for bigger splits and lived off the credit of 'the unity of the Maoists'.

[64] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 180, 387 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). The OPK embraced the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement's Declaration and Long Live Marxism-Leninism-Maoism as the party's international line.

[65] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 421 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). The OPK's adoption of the Maoism formulation and determination of Maoism as the third qualitative stage of the science.

[66] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 436–437 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). The wrong policy of settling the entire Political Bureau in the countryside. Even militia and courier resources were not provided to the SB in the guerrilla zone. 'The essential thing is not protection but ideological-political leadership'.

[67] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 439 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). Cüneyt Kahraman, as Military Commission member responsible for logistics, 'ran from action to action' and was disabled for two years, a rejection of the logic of peasant guerrilla war developing 'from the small to the large, from the simple to the complex, from the weak to the strong'. The SB's own participation in an action was claimed in the name of the 'SB Press Unit'. The agent NT's boast that 'if not for the military actions I carried out after the OPK, the party would not exist today' was the confession of a line that looks at matters from the muzzle of the gun.

[68] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 455 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). In the 1994 split the main responsibility was borne by the OPO clique under HH, and a secondary share by the left-sectarian liquidationist AK clique.

[69] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 475 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf).

Cüneyt Kahraman, the party's Fourth General Secretary, fell on 15 March 1997. The wounded were not evacuated though evacuation was possible, and the unit commander's 'panic and selfish conduct' was judged a war crime. The General Secretary's pistol was not left with him despite his request.

[70] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 478 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). The leadership 'lacked leadership consciousness and representational power' and 'behaved as if it were a fighter'. Fighters requested for the General Secretary's security were not provided in time. The decisive reason the party survived was the abiding trust in the TKP(ML)'s general ideological-political line and the great sacrifice of countless cadres, members and fighters.

[71] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 456 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). After the 1994 split no qualitative difference from the opportunist lines of the past was found, because no thoroughgoing MLM ideological rupture was achieved.

[72] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 461 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). The mass line was destroyed to a significant degree, for 'when the organization is used as an aim rather than a means, ideological degeneration has already begun'.

[73] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 473 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). The Congress Preparation Conference treated the Kardelen Operation only in its military dimension, detaching success from its ideological-political essence.

[74] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 470 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). The KHK acted sectarianly toward the members labeled the 'liquidationist clique', failing to work patiently to persuade them.

[75] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 480 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). The decision to convene the party's First Congress in 1999 was subjective, since the Central Committee lacked the capacity and the MLM line. Replacing it with a Central Conference was the most correct policy.

[76] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 481 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). The 1999 Central Conference's decisions on members who had not or could not attend were essentially negative. Memberships were dropped, double standards were applied, and comrades were tried and expelled in a sectarian manner.

[77] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 501 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). The post-split TKP/ML line as left-sectarian and adventurist, with means put before ends, as in the slogan 'everything for the party'.

[78] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 498 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). The TKP/ML's sectarian and destructive policy toward the MKP after the split.

[79] *Maoist Komünist Partisi II. Kongre Belgeleri,* p. 33 (II.-KONGRE-BELGESI.pdf). On 17 June 2005 at Mercan, seventeen leading cadres, members and fighters were killed,

including General Secretary Cafer Cangöz and Deputy Secretary Aydın Hanbayat. 'One of the most important losses in party history', to be analyzed scientifically in all its ideological-political-organizational-military aspects.

[80] *Maoist Komünist Partisi II. Kongre Belgeleri,* p. 34 (II.-KONGRE-BELGESI.pdf). The organizational and military causes of the Mercan catastrophe included compromised channels, the weaker congress site, collective departure, telephone use, collective farewells and deşifrasyon, legal-illegal mixing, and insisting on the same area, together with a limited security force, collective transport, unsuitable terrain, and improper positioning.

[81] *Maoist Komünist Partisi II. Kongre Belgeleri,* p. 35 (II.-KONGRE-BELGESI.pdf). The political cause was subjectivism, assessments 'ahead of objective reality'. 'The blow we received entirely because of the subjectivism we fell into is not a loss in the form of fate or the inevitable'.

[82] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 433 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). Strategic leadership is determining. It is the center that manages the entire war, comprehending all parts individually and in their interrelations, the 'orchestra conductor' who applies strategy in every concrete situation.

[83] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 434 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). 'The sole guarantee of the success of a long-term strategic struggle is this strategic leadership itself'.

[84] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 435 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). The leadership was repeatedly thrown into the hottest arenas of struggle, making the greatest sacrifices, yet could not fulfill its mission of ideological-political direction.

[85] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 191 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). The predominant thinking methods were dogmatism among the urban petty bourgeoisie and narrow empiricism among the rural petty bourgeoisie, both fed by subjectivism.

[86] *İbrahim Kaypakkaya, Seçme Yazılar / Selected Works,* p. 171 (ibrahim-kaypakkaya-sw-2014.pdf). Kaypakkaya writes, 'On the condition of following a correct policy we may commence armed struggle while our organisation is still very limited and expand and consolidate both our forces and our organisation within the armed struggle'.

[87] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "İdeoloji: Marksizm-Leninizm-Maoizm",* p. 116 (IDEOLOJI-PDF.pdf). People's war is defined as the general strategy and political line of the New Democratic Revolution, seizing countrywide power by building red political powers under the leadership of the Maoist party. Any revolutionary strategy not proceeding from the perspective of liberated areas and red political powers cannot be considered a real people's war.

[88] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 432 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). 'The importance of leadership was not grasped and was trivialized'. Strategic leadership is determining.

[89] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 364 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). Unity, the unity of MLMs, is not built on bargaining.

[90] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 286 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). The roots of the 1994 split and factionalizations reach back to the five-year process after the 1987 split.

[91] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 210 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). Resistance in the prisons, like resistance under torture, is a matter of principle.

[92] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi),* p. 228 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). The positive tradition and legacy of resistance was not sufficiently carried to the masses nor used as an instrument of organizing the revolution.

[93] *Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "İdeoloji: Marksizm-Leninizm-Maoizm",* p. 72 (IDEOLOJI-PDF.pdf). The damage of the First Conference's rejection of the MZD formulation could not be rooted out for years.

[94] *Maoist Komünist Partisi II. Kongre Belgeleri,* p. 38 (II.-KONGRE-BELGESI.pdf). The party must 'immediately organize around the central leadership', carrying out organizational activity through top-down central intervention and supervision within democratic centralism.

[95] *Maoist Komünist Partisi II. Kongre Belgeleri,* p. 68 (II.-KONGRE-BELGESI.pdf). The leadership must not be risked for short-term tactical successes, and the collective leadership institution must be created.

[96] *Maoist Komünist Partisi II. Kongre Belgeleri,* p. 77 (II.-KONGRE-BELGESI.pdf). The Second Congress held that there can be no copy revolutions and revolutions cannot be imported. Had China crudely repeated the Soviet model, there would have been no Chinese revolution. The fociist and spontaneist lines must be definitively broken with.

[97] Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi), p. 16 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). Kaypakkaya's February 1972 'Eastern Anatolia Regional Committee (DABK) decision', adopted by three votes to one at the committee's 7–8 February meeting, became the first turning point in the formation of the TKP(ML); the committee consisted of Kaypakkaya (responsible, with a double vote), Bora Gözen and Muzaffer Oruçoğlu.

[98] Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi), p. 77 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). The First MK 'did not even dare to express the lands on which the oppressed Kurdish nation lives as Kurdistan'; the oppressed nation's region was named the 'Eastern Anatolia Regional Committee'.

[99] Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, "TKP(ML)'den Maoist Komünist Partisi'ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!" (Muhasebe Belgesi), pp. 168–169 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). The Second MK's liquidationist course, the repeated postponement of the Third Conference, the martyrdom of seven delegates in November 1986, and the formation of the Provisional Regional Committee (GBK) from which the KÖK understanding emerged.

[100] Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, “TKP(ML)’den Maoist Komünist Partisi’ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!” (Muhasebe Belgesi), pp. 170–171 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). The conference moved abroad, the KÖK proposal withdrawn, Kazım Çelik's martyrdom at Palu in May 1987, the returning guerrilla unit's declaration that it would not recognize the conference, and DABK's 'Extraordinary Regional Conference' of August–September 1987; the delegates stood ready to hand the party leadership over to the regional delegates.

[101] Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, “TKP(ML)’den Maoist Komünist Partisi’ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!” (Muhasebe Belgesi), p. 175 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). The 1984 MK decision to hold the conference in the countryside, reversed after the Hürmek clash. 'In this respect DABK's separation is not without reason, but its attitude is an anti-Maoist attitude'.

[102] Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, “TKP(ML)’den Maoist Komünist Partisi’ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!” (Muhasebe Belgesi), pp. 231–232 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). Of DABK's four delegates, two were at the conference site and two were preparing to depart; with the western delegate Manuel Demir, seven members in the guerrilla zone sided with DABK, while the overwhelming majority of members and delegates went to the conference. To restrict the party's composition to members in Turkey-Northern Kurdistan is to substitute regionalism for Maoist organizational principles.

[103] Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, “TKP(ML)’den Maoist Komünist Partisi’ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!” (Muhasebe Belgesi), p. 257 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). The Third MK numbered seven full and two alternate members, with five more elected from the prisons, two of whom sided with DABK and three with the Conference.

[104] Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, “TKP(ML)’den Maoist Komünist Partisi’ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!” (Muhasebe Belgesi), pp. 320–321, 325, 341 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). DABK's September 1987 'Extraordinary Regional Party Conference Report' named the Second MK the representative of a 'systematized revisionist line' and announced that 'we have expelled the revisionist leadership from the organization'; the congress judged this characterization subjective and sectarian.

[105] Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, “TKP(ML)’den Maoist Komünist Partisi’ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!” (Muhasebe Belgesi), pp. 342–343 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). DABK's 'exit perspective': a conference held with the revisionists 'will not be a conference that solves the party's existing problems, but one that aggravates them and formalizes the liquidation of the party's line'.

[106] Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, “TKP(ML)’den Maoist Komünist Partisi’ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!” (Muhasebe Belgesi), p. 174 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). DABK's method compared with the GKK's: in both, petit-bourgeois haste and impatience dominated and both went to organizational split without waiting for the conference; but unlike the GKK, DABK formed no clandestine faction, acted openly as a

regional organization with the MK's knowledge, and generally observed party discipline until the split.

[107] Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, “TKP(ML)’den Maoist Komünist Partisi’ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!” (Muhasebe Belgesi), pp. 172, 340 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). Kaypakkaya evaluated the TİİKP leadership as revisionist yet waged two years of ideological struggle inside the organization and sought the congress platform to proclaim his views; the revisionists did not permit it.

[108] Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, “TKP(ML)’den Maoist Komünist Partisi’ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!” (Muhasebe Belgesi), p. 346 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). The regional conference elected a seven-person leading organ, including the conference delegate Manuel Demir, whose goal was to restore the central structure and convene a new conference; close to thirty cadres, members and fighters participated.

[109] Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, “TKP(ML)’den Maoist Komünist Partisi’ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!” (Muhasebe Belgesi), p. 358 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). Baba Erdoğan's appointment to the Black Sea was not correct; the removal of an MK member whose activities in the General Command were unsuccessful and his appointment to the Political Bureau, a product of the purely military viewpoint, showed the Political Bureau regarded as less important than the General Command.

[110] Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, “TKP(ML)’den Maoist Komünist Partisi’ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!” (Muhasebe Belgesi), p. 356 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). Even had the action ended successfully the essential truth would not change; Baba Yoldaş's personal participation in the action on the eve of the MK meeting, when such risky actions should not have been undertaken; a leading cadre heading such an action cannot be evaluated independently of DABK's left-opportunist line and the pressure created by the inability to carry out a serious guerrilla attack after the Third Conference.

[111] Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, “TKP(ML)’den Maoist Komünist Partisi’ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!” (Muhasebe Belgesi), p. 356 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). The purely military viewpoint that became dominant in DABK and enveloped its cadres exacted heavy prices by preventing the institutionalization of ideological, political and organizational leadership; within DABK there were many comrades who did not understand or grasp that the people's army is an armed force for fulfilling the political tasks of the revolution.

[112] Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, “TKP(ML)’den Maoist Komünist Partisi’ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!” (Muhasebe Belgesi), p. 357 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). Mao's 1929 theses: those who disregard subjective and objective conditions are struck by the disease of revolutionary impetuosity, unwilling to take the trouble of painstaking and detailed work among the masses and wanting only to accomplish great deeds, a remnant of putschism; when errors corresponding to this line were pointed out in DABK ranks before 1995, discussion of the question was blocked by resorting to many forms of blackmail, including the threat of split.

[113] Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, “TKP(ML)’den Maoist Komünist Partisi’ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!” (Muhasebe Belgesi), p. 355 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). At the first MK meeting Baba Yoldaş attended, the decision was taken to open up to the Black Sea region and he was appointed to head the organization there; in August 1990 a guerrilla unit under his command set foot in Central Anatolia with very few forces, giving life to the slogan 'One Dersim Is Not Enough, the Target Must Be a Thousand Dersims'; the Kardelen Operation revealed that he was shot by the agent Nihat and was not rescued although there were possibilities to do so.

[114] Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, “TKP(ML)’den Maoist Komünist Partisi’ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!” (Muhasebe Belgesi), p. 348 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). The January 1988 Kandıra barracks raid led by Baba Erdoğan: militarily successful and its political message enormous and indisputable, yet the party had always highlighted only this positive side; within a few days every participant except one fell into the enemy's hands, Baba Erdoğan captured alive and Manuel Demir executed in the street immediately upon capture, neutralizing DABK's most experienced leading cadres in a single blow.

[115] Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, “TKP(ML)’den Maoist Komünist Partisi’ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!” (Muhasebe Belgesi), p. 350 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). Communist leadership is not exhausted by courage and self-sacrifice: it means foreseeing the future, making not short- but long-term calculations, determining policy appropriate to the concrete situation and instilling it in the organization; Baba Erdoğan's series of deficiencies and inadequacies in this regard; in March 1988 DABK leader Seyfi Batar fell martyr in Diyarbakır together with two comrades and Metin Kaya fell in a clash in Dersim.

[116] Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, “TKP(ML)’den Maoist Komünist Partisi’ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!” (Muhasebe Belgesi), p. 348 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). The Kandıra action exposed that the Istanbul organization was hollow and lacked the quality to bear such an action; it collapsed under a light blow; when an organization collapses under an action, the correct course is to postpone that action, the contrary practice losing both organizationally and militarily.

[117] Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, “TKP(ML)’den Maoist Komünist Partisi’ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!” (Muhasebe Belgesi), p. 374 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). The period after the 1987 split as the period in which counter-revolutionaries were intensively infiltrated into party ranks; no report system was operated in admitting members to the party or fighters to the army, countless dubious elements were packed into party and army ranks on the references of various 'chiefs', and not even a serious archive was kept of who joined, how, and through whom.

[118] Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, “TKP(ML)’den Maoist Komünist Partisi’ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!” (Muhasebe Belgesi), p. 349 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). No one directly asked Baba Erdoğan to carry out such an action, but the left line pushed him there: the understanding of 'always forward, never stopping, always attack, never retreat' governed this practice, and even walking a cautious line was

evaluated in the party as right-opportunism; he was shot during the attack by the agent Nihat and fell martyr without being rescued.

[119] Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, “TKP(ML)’den Maoist Komünist Partisi’ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!” (Muhasebe Belgesi), p. 350 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). Within barely six months of the split, five of the cadres elected to the leading body at the regional conference were either martyred or captured, leaving only two; many comrades who could not correspond to the leadership quality were then appointed to the DABK leading organ 'out of necessity', among them the agent Nihat.

[120] Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, “TKP(ML)’den Maoist Komünist Partisi’ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!” (Muhasebe Belgesi), p. 359 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). The military successes of 1991 intoxicated DABK's cadres and carried the purely military viewpoint to its peak: the party's importance was belittled within the army ranks, party representatives and party members in the guerrilla units were regarded almost as stumbling blocks and despised, sectarianism flourished boundlessly in organizational relations, organizational principles were trampled, and the formula 'commissars are rightists, commanders are leftists' emerged within the army.

[121] Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, “TKP(ML)’den Maoist Komünist Partisi’ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!” (Muhasebe Belgesi), p. 358 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). Throughout its five-year history DABK never grasped the decisive importance of leadership; the cadres appointed to the Political Bureau were constantly belittled and even exposed among the fighter mass on the grounds that 'they do nothing, they are rightists', and it was 'desired' that the Political Bureau lead the party politically and ideologically while conducting activity in the villages like an ordinary guerrilla under the supervision of an ordinary commander.

[122] Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, “TKP(ML)’den Maoist Komünist Partisi’ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!” (Muhasebe Belgesi), p. 368 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). Although 'expanding by concentrating' or 'advancing by concentrating' was decided, in practice the opposite was done: intoxicated by victory, the qualitatively and quantitatively weak guerrilla forces were scattered with 'grasshopper tactics' to Central Anatolia, the Eastern Black Sea and the Amed region; the most select leaders and commanders, Seyfi Batar, Hasan Toy, Baba Erdoğan, İsmail Bulut, Doğan Karadağ, lost their lives as the product of this adventurist policy.

[123] Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, “TKP(ML)’den Maoist Komünist Partisi’ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!” (Muhasebe Belgesi), p. 438 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-BELGESI.pdf). The success of a military line must be evaluated not by how many clashes were entered, how many ambushes laid, how many actions carried out, but by whether the political tasks of the revolution, propaganda and agitation, organizing and arming the masses, establishing village party committees, assisting party organization within the army and militia organization, were successfully fulfilled.

[124] Maoist Komünist Partisi 1. Kongre Belgeleri, “TKP(ML)’den Maoist Komünist Partisi’ne, Bu Tarih Bizim!” (Muhasebe Belgesi), p. 356 (I.-KONGRE-MUHASEBE-

BELGESI.pdf). Mao's 1929 analysis of the purely military viewpoint in the Red Army: military action is only one of the means for accomplishing political tasks; the Red Army is an armed body for carrying out the political tasks of the revolution, and besides fighting to destroy the enemy's military strength it must shoulder such tasks as propaganda among the masses, organizing and arming them, helping them establish revolutionary political power and setting up party organizations, without which fighting loses its meaning and the Red Army its reason for existence.