The People's Hammer

Canada Post, Purolator, and Liquidation in the Public Sector – by Hank

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Today Canadian workers find themselves in the midst of acute imperialist crisis. Inter-imperialist competition has found new vigor largely due to threats of U.S. tariffs, leaving the Canadian bourgeoisie scrambling to find new methods of capital accumulation and extraction to counteract falling rates of profit. While this negatively affects the whole of the Canadian proletariat generally, these conditions manifest themselves with emboldened antagonism in the public sector. These conditions sharpen the antagonisms between private and state capital. Private capital, continuously looking to broaden its industrial means, targets state capital in order to increase its control over the marketplace so as to maintain a competitive edge against foreign imperialist rivals. State capital, meanwhile, is in a position of increased weakness due to its inability to exploit labour for super-profits at the same rate as private capital which operates multinational corporations. In any industry or sector where state and private capital both operate, if either branch of capital is out-competed to the point that it can no longer extract surplus value at a rate necessary to maintain profit then it will cease to operate in that industry in distinction to the other. The most advantageous economic position for state capital under these circumstances is to become absorbed by private capital for the simple fact that, if it does not do so, it will continue to lose profit at an ever-growing rate. As Marxism teaches us the state is the organ of class rule. While the state, and its capital, may at times present itself in greater distinction to the bourgeoisie, state capital will also amalgamate more deeply into the most reactionary camps of the bourgeoisie if class antagonisms warrant this development; liquidating if necessary into private capital. Presently this tendency appears to be emerging within Canada Post. How can we observe this?

For the last seven years Canada Post has not been profitable—their last profitable year was recorded in 2017.1 Before 2024, Canada Post had continuously attributed these losses to changing conditions in the postal industry. The commentary put forward by Canada Post in their 2023 annual financial report explains these circumstances as follows:

“Canada hit peak mail volume in 2006. That year, we delivered almost 5.5 billion letters…In 2023, we delivered less than 2.2 billion letters, significantly impacting revenue and that erosion will continue. Back in 2006, Canadian households received an average of seven letters per week; today it’s two per week. In addition, more than 200,000 new addresses are added each year. We served 17.4 million addresses in 2023, over three million more than in 2006…Prior to the pandemic, Canada Post already understood that it needed to become more agile and competitive to respond to the demand for reliable and convenient parcel delivery…[Our] competitors grew rapidly, leaning on their low-cost-labour business models that rely on contracted drivers to provide lower prices, plus greater convenience with evening and weekend service. These low-cost private operators have gained significant ground, particularly in the last two years, by focusing on serving international retail giants. Our estimated market share in parcel delivery has quickly eroded by more than half – from 62 per cent prior to the pandemic to 29 per cent in 2023(!!).”2, 3

It must be restated that their quote implies that Canada Post has lost more than one-third of the national parcel delivery market share in less than five years. Its inability to, self-admittedly, compete with the “international retail giants” signals that state capital has fallen far behind private capital in terms of general productivity in this industry within Canada. The last calendar year has only demonstrated an intensification of private capital’s dominance in this market over state capital.

In 2024, Canada Post delivered a record operating loss of 1.3 billion dollars.4 This marks the Crown jewel of over 4.5 billion dollars in operational losses accumulated by the Corporation since 2018. In an attempt to offset these immense losses, Canada Post sold off two of its subsidiaries; SCI Group Inc. and Innovapost Inc. to Metro Supply Chain Inc., a Montréal-based privately owned supply chain company, and Deloitte Canada, the Canadian member firm of the U.K. financial services company Deloitte Global, respectively.5 In a January 2024 news release Canada Post explained that it was “finalizing a transaction to sell SCI Group Inc. (SCI) to Metro Supply Chain”6 and that the sale of the subsidiary is part of Canada Post’s “comprehensive transformation plan” in the midst of its present crisis.7 Upon being asked by the CBC what would happen to the 3000 workers under SCI Group once the transaction went through, Canada Post deferred all questions to Metro Supply Chain on the matter; Metro Supply Chain followed by declining to answer.8 The nature of the Innovapost sell-off is even more ambiguous.In a second January 2024 news release Canada Post described that it had “entered into an agreement to transition Innovapost to Deloitte Canada”9 but did not explicitly detail that it had sold this venture to Deloitte in this column. Scanning through dozens of pages in their financial report for this year, one may find tucked away on the thirty-sixth page the following quote by Canada Post: “In 2024, as part of its efforts to focus on providing a modern postal service, Canada Post divested 100 per cent of the shares of two subsidiaries…they did not come close to offsetting the company’s 2024 financial loss or deteriorating liquidity position.”10 If this is what is meant when Canada Post proclaims an “agreement to transition” one only has to guess what sort of “transformation” is soon to come from this “comprehensive plan” of theirs! Canada Post admits with subtlety that it could enter liquidation as a direct result of being out-competed by the “international retail giants.” But rather than struggling alongside the rank-and-file to protect the jobs of workers in their subsidiaries, rather than co-ordinating with their unions to begin launching a political line internally, rather than bringing any political line to other unions and non-unionized proletarians to combat encroachments by the bourgeoisie, Canada Post is instead beginning the process of selling out their own workers directly to the bourgeoisie! This comes as no surprise. State capital, Canada Post, no longer stands to benefit economically from competing against private capital because it will lose. This has been demonstrated with particular salience over the last seven years and generally for the last two decades. This “transition” Canada Post speaks of is really to begin amalgamating itself more deeply into private capital by means of liquidation.

Some might argue that the Government of Canada’s decision to inject over 1 billion dollars into Canada Post to prevent insolvency during the 2025-26 fiscal year is a sure sign that the state is attempting to prevent liquidation at any cost. Some might also argue that their opening of a 585,000 sq. ft. parcel processing facility in Scarborough, costing 470 million dollars, in 2023 is even more indicative that this “transformation plan” has state capital trying to recapture a competitive edge.11 In both cases they would be wrong. The first occurrence is an attempt by the state to use finance capital in the form of loans to sink its company into debt, providing the Federal Government with an eventual stream of payment to stall its own crisis as it continues to liquidate into private capital. While the terms of the loan do not appear to be publicly available, Public Services and Procurement Canada stated that the short-term loan was one that Canada Post would be “required to repay.”12 Even if it were structured as an interest-free loan, the Government of Canada unintentionally admits that it is unwilling to sacrifice its own capital to prolong competition against private capital in this sector. Canada Post, meanwhile, appears to know a thing or two about loan repayments, having launched the “competitive” Canada Post MyMoney Loan program as a joint venture with TD Bank in the fall of 2022.13 And the second occurrence becomes irrelevant when one considers that after Canada Post opened this facility it then proceeded to lose over one billion dollars in the following fiscal year! Canada Post would not open such a facility out of the goodness of their hearts; their enterprises need to be profitable, especially as it stares down the barrel of liquidation. The facility is, for now, accelerating their crisis! This is an attempt by state capital to present itself as distinct from private capital as it amalgamates more deeply within its camp. This becomes clear when one outlines Canada Post’s economic position in relation to its private courier subsidiary; Purolator.

In the same year that the Crown Corporation posted a loss of 1.3 billion dollars, Purolator delivered profits (before tax) of nearly 300 million dollars.14 This represents growth in year-to-year profits of over 80% from 2018 to 2024 for Purolator in the same seven-year period that Canada Post lost nearly 5 billion dollars!15 Canada Post is the de facto owner of Purolator, boasting a 91% holding stake in the company. As Canada Post develops its productive capacity Purolator is following suit. This is demonstrated by their recently built 450,000 sq. ft. parcel processing facility stationed in Etobicoke, costing over 300 million dollars, which entered into production in 2022.16 In their 2022 financial report Canada Post explains that the e-commerce market will more than double in the next decade. It seems Canada Post was trying to hedge its bets. By completing its Purolator facility while in the midst of building its Canada Post facility, the Corporation was waiting to see how immediately it needed to absorb itself into private capital as it was losing money. This process has been developing unevenly over the last seven years but the death knell that was the 2024 fiscal year signaled to Canada Post that the contradiction between state and private capital had come to a head. In any liberal democracy private capital is the principal aspect. Given the conditions Canada Post has found itself in, its planted seeds of private enterprise are finally beginning to flower. If Canada Post wants to re-establish itself as a dominant force in this doubling marketplace it must become absorbed into private capital through its growing subsidiary. Canada Post is vying to have their larger facility eventually fall under direct ownership of Purolator. The organization of both companies’ directorial boards seem to corroborate this as well; both the CEO and Chair of the Board of Directors for Canada Post, Doug Ettinger and André Huron, sit on the Board of Directors for Purolator. At least two others, Michèle Desjardins and Sharon Sparkes, had previously sat on Canada Post’s directorial board but are now only members on Purolator’s.17 These discreet attempts of re-organization at the level of company leadership signal that this “transformation plan” is meant to bring the spoils of private enterprise to those atop the Crown Corporation, but at what cost? The Canada Post facility which is significantly larger than Purolator’s is bleeding capital while its subsidiary continues to generate more and more. Currently there is one reason for this: the workers under Canada Post.

Earlier it had been said that before last year Canada Post attributed its losses to changing conditions in the parcel industry. As of 2024 Canada Post has gone to blaming its workers. Their attitude towards the 2024 strike action can be summarized by as follows: “with revenue falling much more than costs during the strike, the Corporation estimates that the labour disruption contributed a net negative impact of 208 million [dollars].”18 Their statement later on in the report that their employees are the “best in the business” is hogwash when one discovers that—on top of their begging Labour Minister Steven MacKinnon and CIRB to force a back-to-work order last December—their subsidiary prepared to deliver over 43 million packages in the midst of the labour strike! Purolator was all smiles, stating that they were “open for business…our network is well prepared and ready to deliver continued success for our customers, and all Canadians, including those who have been impacted by the recent Canada Post labour disruption.”19 This should come as nothing short of an insult to the striking postal workers who, amongst other demands, struggled in picket lines against Canada Post for wage increases that matched rates of inflation and against Canada Post’s pitch for seven-day-a-week delivery; their front to begin hiring a new legion of part-time workers. Canada Post describes this as creating “flexibility” while disgruntled workers were quick to point out that these new workers, who may end up working as little as a meager eight hours per week, would be strung along for months before being eligible for benefits currently set at the 1000 hour threshold.20 It would seem that Canada Post is taking a note out of the “low-cost-labour models” that they seemed to decry in 2023! Canada Post is, in effect, attempting to introduce this influx of part-time workers so as to make larger their reserve army of labour, which pits workers against one another due to scarcity of employment in the market, distracting them from their task of dismantling the state!

On this matter of Purolator continuing to operate during the strike the union structures between Canada Post and Purolator are worth consideration. Canada Post is largely represented by the Canadian Union of Postal Workers (CUPW) and partially represented by APOC, CPAA, PSAC, and UPCE.21 Purolator meanwhile is largely represented by the American trade union Teamsters. A pathetic display of “full support” was put forward by Teamsters during the CUPW strike, where a representative explained that they would demonstrate solidarity by refusing to handle packages marked by Canada Post.22 If their goal was to stop Canada Post from continuing operations during the strike, Teamsters ought to have joined CUPW in the strike effort.

Should Canada Post fully liquidate into Purolator the company would be in an advantageous position with respect to its then central union, Teamsters, given that the union operates principally in the United States. A union based in the U.S. would be far less likely to support a Canadian labour cause, especially given that Canadian membership of ≈130,000 makes up only 10% of the ≈1,300,000 total North American Teamsters membership. This is before explaining that given the nature of trade unions generally, which represent different industries and/or specific workers within industries, workers that do not belong to the striking industry often feel that there is no economic incentive from participating in such a strike. These sentiments emerge from a combination of intimidation by the bourgeoisie and labour passivity of the union bureaucrats and must be resisted.23, 24 We can already see other examples of how the bourgeoisie is unpertured by these scattered international trade unions. As recently as June 8 2025, DHL Express Canada locked out over 2,100 workers unionized under Unifor after they had approached the company with a 72-hour strike notice.25 DHL is hoping to leverage hiring scabs and believes their Canadian production will not be impacted in the midst of the strike. Where are the other unions that represent workers in the DHL internationally? Time will tell. But at the moment DHL is confident that they will not apply any pressure whatsoever, else they would have not locked out their workers so unceremoniously. All of this points us in one direction; the rank-and-file under Purolator are in a weakened position to negotiate for their interests due to their belonging to a principally American trade union in a myriad of industries, meaning that efforts to militarize will not be met with the necessary strength to win struggles against the bourgeoisie. The trade union structure prioritizes passivity rather than militancy. By absorbing itself into Purolator, Canada Post will mitigate the effectiveness of labour strikes that have so heavily impacted their profitability.

Given Canada Post’s continued economic losses, the preparations Canada Post is taking to develop Purolator’s productive forces, the reorganization and concentration of its board’s directors into its private subsidiary, its attempts to leverage part-time and temporary workers, and its overwhelming dissatisfaction with its own workers alongside the economic desirability of Purolator’s international trade union structure it is evident that Canada Post is in the preparatory stages of liquidating its operations and privatizing completely within its subsidiary with the hopes of securing a more dominant economic position for private capital and the bourgeoisie. The workers and masses must absolutely struggle against this development! But how will we successfully assert our dominance on this front? Workers in the rank-and-file must struggle for the amalgamation of all existing postal trade unions into one industrial postal union that incorporates all workers regardless of skill; and for the formation of workplace committees as the basic units of this industrial union. The masses in Canada must struggle to develop a Communist Party that will be the vanguard to advance the progressive classes towards socialist revolution. The Canadian state is in a position of weakness. It would not be selling off its industry if it occupied a position of strength. Now more than ever workers must fight against Canada Post’s “transformation plan” to liquidate and privatize. We must begin working to challenge the state!

References

1. https://www.canadapost-postescanada.ca/cpc/doc/en/aboutus/financialreports/2017_ar_complete_en.pdf

2. https://www.canadapost-postescanada.ca/cpc/doc/en/aboutus/financialreports/2023-annual-financial-report.pdf

3. Exclamation marks of the writer.

4. https://www.canadapost-postescanada.ca/cpc/doc/en/aboutus/financialreports/2024-annual-financial-report.pdf

5. For its part SCI Group Inc. boasts over 75 locations, 4 million square feet of industrial space, and roughly 3000 employees, 353 of which are represented by Unifor. The company works in logistics, technology consulting, warehousing, etc. Innovapost boasts an employee count of roughly 750. They are an IT services provider.

6. https://www.canadapost-postescanada.ca/cpc/en/our-company/news-and-media/corporate-news/news-release/2024-01-09-canada-post-to-sell-sci-group-to-montreal-based-metro-supply-chain

7. Ibid.

8. https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-post-selling-logistics-business-1.7079094

9. https://www.canadapost-postescanada.ca/cpc/en/our-company/news-and-media/corporate-news/news-release/2024-01-16-canada-post-transforming-it-model-to-better-serve-canadians

10. https://www.canadapost-postescanada.ca/cpc/doc/en/aboutus/financialreports/2024-annual-financial-report.pdf

11. https://www.canadapost-postescanada.ca/cpc/en/our-company/news-and-media/corporate-news/news-release/2023-09-21-canada-post-officially-opens-the-albert-jackson-processing-centre

12. https://www.canada.ca/en/public-services-procurement/news/2025/01/statement-by-public-services-and-procurement-canada-on-a-cash-injection-for-canada-post-for-the-202526-fiscal-year.html

13. https://www.canadapost-postescanada.ca/cpc/en/our-company/news-and-media/corporate-news/news-release/2022-10-12-canada-post-and-td-delivers-simple-and-affordable-loans-for-more-canadians

14. https://www.canadapost-postescanada.ca/cpc/doc/en/aboutus/financialreports/2024-annual-financial-report.pdf

15. https://www.canadapost-postescanada.ca/cpc/doc/en/annual-reports/2018_AR_Financial_Sections_en.pdf

16. https://canada.constructconnect.com/dcn/news/projects/2022/08/package-delivered-purolators-new-330m-national-hub-unveiled

17. https://www.purolator.com/en/media/15551/download?attachment

18. https://www.canadapost-postescanada.ca/cpc/doc/en/aboutus/financialreports/2024-annual-financial-report.pdf

19. https://www.purolator.com/en/articles/purolator-network-ready-deliver-all-canadians-ahead-busiest-time-year

20. https://www.biv.com/news/economy-law-politics/canada-post-strike-key-issues-in-the-dispute-thats-holding-up-mail-delivery-9913632

21. The CUPW represents roughly 54,000 workers within Canada Post. The Association of Postal Officials of Canada (APOC) represents roughly 3400 workers; the Canadian Postmasters and Assistants Association (CPAA) represents roughly 12,000 workers; the Union of Postal Communication employees (UPCE), itself a branch of the Public Service Alliance in Canada (PSAC), jointly represent roughly 4200 workers. CUPW has approached the CPAA with several merger proposals which have been continually rejected. Their trade union structure is principally responsible for this, but more research is needed as to the particular reasons why the CPAA is disinterested in merging with the CUPW.

22. https://globalnews.ca/news/10871649/purolator-canada-post-strike-packages/

23. Cliff Z., one of our comrades at the People’s Hammer, wrote an excellent article on the importance of striking between industries following Canada Post’s shameful decision to force its workers to end the strike: https://peopleshammer.wordpress.com/2025/01/26/canada-post-strike-in-review-by-cliff-z/

24. This labour passivity is severely hindering worker militancy within CUPW and the smaller Canada Post unions. The union’s recent decision to refuse overtime work rather than picket will do nothing to impede Canada Post’s liquidation or improve working conditions.

25. https://www.msn.com/en-in/news/other/canada-s-package-delivery-chaos-worsens-as-dhl-locks-out-2100-workers-after-canada-post-chaos/ar-AA1GklzK


Responses to “Canada Post, Purolator, and Liquidation in the Public Sector – by Hank”

  1. We’ve Gotta Find Our Way… Back to the Strike! – By Bessy – The People's Hammer
  2. Worker Frustration Mounts as Canada Post Liquidates — By Hank – The People's Hammer