The Ruthless Criticism of All that Exists
Within contemporary debate on national liberation, particularly in Canada, an idea of “settler-colonialism” is frequently mentioned and even taken as a given form of oppression for progressive workers to fight against in the country. To dispute its usefulness or even existance is often understood as national chauvanism, as if the concept itself were synonymous with opposing colonialism. That assumption must be rejected. Any worker seeking liberation cannot just take up any radical sounding slogan or theory, but must analyse its substance and worth. It isn’t merely enough to sound radical when our understanding of the world is incorrect. Further, just because a theory may condemn crimes of our class enemies, this does not mean it is useful. Liberalism condemns colonial crimes. NGOs condemn colonial crimes. The question is whether an understanding clarifies the concrete structure of oppression of working people, and the path toward its overthrow. In the case of “settler-colonialism” the idea must been seen for what it is, a substitute of scientific analysis for moral consensus.
Now, this is not to deny colonialism in Canada, nor oppose national liberation of the oppressed nations in Canada. In fact, it seeks to aid the liberation of all oppressed nations as revolutionary workers must have a correct worldview to defeat these systems that hold down the working-class, particularly the continued imperialism committed by the Canadian and Quebecois bourgeoisies against Indigenous nations. These facts are not in dispute. What is, is the theory of “settler-colonialism” as it functions: what it explains, what it cannot explain, and what politics it reliably produces.
A Marxist approach begins from political economy and developing a scientific analysis of the world. Any concept claiming explanatory power must be judged by whether it sharpens that analysis and allows us to better understand these conditions and how to fight them, or whether it obfuscates the path forward. “Settler-colonialism,” in both its academic form and its popularized form, fails this test.
“Settler-colonialism”1 originates in the post-1960s academic world and is based on the philosophy of emerging post-modernism of the time.2 It substitutes political economy with moral categories,3 avoids a stable definition and criteria, and therefore becomes so maleable as an idea it is functionally empty.4 in its popular left variant, exemplified by J. Sakai’s Settlers, it produces a liquidationist line that abandons any mass work. In place of this, we require a dialectical-materialist analysis of imperialism, the national question, and of colonial relations through state power and capital.
Colonialism is a Relation of Production, Not a Moral Identity
Before proceeding, several concepts must be clarified as much of the confusion around “settler-colonialism” stems from undefined or mystified terms.
Firstly, is the idea of “elimination” that settler-colonialism is heavily based on, created from the academic, Patrick Wolfe. When Wolfe speaks of a “logic of elimination,” he does not mean constant physical genocide, but a range of processes through which Indigenous presence is removed as a political obstacle to the imperialist state: displacement, assimilation, legal erasure, confinement, or absorption into property relations. In Wolfe’s own formulation, elimination is structural and ongoing, not episodic.5 The problem is not that this observation is false, but that it is presented as a transhistorical logic rather than analyzed as a function of specific modes of production and state forms.
In contrast, a dialectical materialist analysis of colonialism in Canada begins with the capitalist mode of production in its imperialist stage. Canada is not a colony; it is an imperialist country integrated into monopoly and finance capital. Indigenous national oppression persists not as a moral residue but as an ongoing material process. Land theft persists because land is not merely territory, but it is a condition for accumulation. Property regimes, Crown land, treaty processes, and licensing systems secure access to resources, rents, and profits. Where “settler-colonialism” speaks in generalities (a “logic of elimination”), Marxism asks how concrete mechanisms reproduce dispossession and class power. Similarly, the bourgeois state is not a neutral referee but the organizer of class domination. Courts, police, corrections, regulatory boards, and administrative regimes enforce property and discipline resistance. A theory that turns colonialism into a moral identity relation will inevitably under-theorize the state. Lastly, an essential to undersand is “bureaucrat capitalism”. This is the form of capitalism dominant in colonised nations, where state-linked capitalists (bureaucrat capitalists) are directed against the masses and intertwined with imperialist domination.6 The key analytic to use here is to grasp how state power and capital fuse in the administration of land, development, and coercion. In Canada, colonial relations are continuously reproduced through a dense apparatus of state agencies, legal frameworks, development authorities, the band councils as bureaucrat capital, and intermediary institutions that manage dispossession and pacification on behalf of monopoly capital.
With these clarifications in place, colonialism can be approached as a relation of production and state power rather than a moral identity.
Marxism does not treat colonialism as a transhistorical phenomenon, nor a sin attached to an ethnic “settler” population. It treats colonialism as a historically specific system bound up with capitalist development: primitive accumulation (violent separation of producers from land and means of subsistence), and later imperialism (monopoly and finance capital, export of capital, and the complete territorial division of the world). The form colonial domination takes depends on the concrete configuration of class forces, the state, and the international position of a country within imperialism.
From this standpoint, the decisive questions are:
- What mode of production predominates and how is surplus extracted?
- What is the character of the state and what class alliance does it embody?
- How does land function as capital (property regimes, rents, resource concessions)?
- How are oppressed nations incorporated, administered, and policed?
- What contradictions exist within the working class, and how can they be organized through struggle?
Any “colonial” theory that does not begin from these questions will tend toward moralism, typology, and strategic confusion, as we see with “settler-colonialism.”
The Postmodern Origins of “Settler-Colonialism”
“Settler-colonialism” did not emerge from revolutionary strategy or the practical requirements of anti-imperialist struggle. It consolidated as a sub-field within postcolonial and decolonial studies.. Patrick Wolfe’s widely cited claim that settler-colonialism is a “structure, not an event” and his emphasis on a “logic of elimination” became canonical.7 Lorenzo Veracini’s programmatic “introducing” texts further institutionalized the framework as a distinct scholarly domain oriented toward typology and interpretive (obfuscating) distinction.8
The postmodern academy is characterized by a retreat from political economy toward “discourse”, identity, and individualized epistemology. Instead of explaining social formations through relations of production and state power, it privileges interpretation through: “logics,” “structures,” “narratives,” and “positionalities.” Settler-colonial theory inherits this thoroughly idealist origin. The result is a framework well suited to moral criticism and academic reproduction, but poorly suited to revolutionary analysis.
Now while it is the case that both Wolfe and Veracini talk about land, and material dispossession and recognize these as fundamental aspects of colonialism like Marxism would, this is not equal to viewing land through the relations of production that dominate it. Instead, these concepts are abstracted away from understanding how colonialism emerged through class forces, and the strategic tasks that revolutionaries must take up to overcome them, but instead create interpretive categories surrounding the phenomenon.
In practice, “settler-colonialism” tends to transform colonial domination into a moral relation between “settlers” and Indigenous peoples. The category “settler” operates as a permanent moral status, assigned collectively and indefinitely.
This shift has decisive consequences.
- Class is demoted. A worker and a capitalist within an imperialist country are flattened into the same political essence. Exploitation is blurred into complicity. It flattens the contradiction between objective class position and subjective class consciousness into viewing all “settlers” as inherently reactionary. Marxism has also never had fear of naming national chauvanism or politics in favour of the capitalist class, but the naming of “settler” becomes a subsitute for analysing how the objective forces produce reactionary ideas within the working-class of an oppressor nation. But the naming becomes substitute for strategy to unite the working-class of all nations in their objective interests against imperialism.
- Strategy is displaced. Instead of splitting the working class from its bourgeois leadership through organization and struggle, politics becomes a ritual of denunciation, confession, and symbolic “unsettling” for the “Indigenous” and self-flagellation without any real concrete action for the “settler”.
- State power recedes. The bourgeois state—property law, police, courts, prisons, resource boards—becomes background scenery, while the foreground is occupied by identities and moral narratives.
This is why the framework travels so easily through NGOs and university politics: it generates endless condemnation compatible with liberal institutions, while leaving the concrete machinery of capitalist state power intact.
The Problem of Definition: A Theory Without Criteria
Like post-modernism generally, “settler-colonialism” resists precise definition. Its boundaries shift depending on political context rather than material criteria. This ambiguity is deliberate. The framework relies on a loose constellation of traits—permanent settlement, land theft, elimination or marginalization of Indigenous populations, absence of a metropole—but never specifies which are necessary, which are sufficient, which are principal, or how contradictions among them are to be resolved.
If the concept is to function as a liberatory analysis, it must specify criteria grounded in political economy. In practice, it does not. Instead, the criteria oscillate:
- Sometimes permanent settlement is decisive.
- Sometimes demographic replacement.
- Sometimes a “logic of elimination.”
- Sometimes the absence of a colonial metropole.
- Sometimes the persistence of land theft under a modern state.
Because none of these are tied to a determinate analysis of mode of production or state form, the concept expands or contracts to fit political intuition rather than scientific explanation. Knowing this, it is useful to look at applying this to several examples of states that could possibly be considered “settler-colonies” to see just how concrete of an idea “settler-colonialism” is.
A. South Africa
Under apartheid, South Africa combined advanced capitalist development with formalized national oppression enforced through the state. White minority rule controlled land, labour mobility, and political rights, while capital accumulation proceeded through mining, agriculture, and industry. After the end of apartheid, South Africa did not cease to be capitalist; it became a bourgeois-democratic republic governed through a Black bourgeoisie integrated into global monopoly capital.
If South Africa remains “settler-colonial,” what exactly is being described? Land ownership patterns? Racial stratification? Historical origins of the state? If it is no longer “settler-colonial,” when and by what material transformation did that status change? Land-ownership largely remains in what would be considered the “settlers”. The “Indigenous” people in this view now have nominal political control of the country. This example also meets the common generalized decisive factor of colonialism being “settlers come to stay”. The framework provides no answer, because it lacks criteria rooted in class power, state form, and the relations of production.
A common response is that South Africa remains settler-colonial because land ownership, agricultural property, and significant sections of capital remain concentrated in the hands of a relatively small minority whose wealth originates in the apartheid period.9 Land reform has been limited, and enormous inequalities persist despite the end of formal white minority rule.
Yet this response only deepens the conceptual problem. If unequal land ownership is the decisive criterion, then many post-colonial societies remain permanently settler-colonial regardless of who exercises state power. If political sovereignty and control of the state are decisive, then apartheid’s defeat represented a qualitative transformation. If both are decisive, no clear threshold exists for determining when settler-colonialism ends.
More importantly, the persistence of concentrated land ownership is not unique to societies labelled settler-colonial. Land concentration exists throughout Latin America, Asia, and Africa, often as a legacy of colonialism and imperialist development. Marxists explain this through class power, property relations, and the continued domination of capital. The category of settler-colonialism adds little explanatory content beyond describing the historical origins of these relations.
The central question is not whether contemporary South Africa retains inequalities inherited from colonialism and apartheid; it plainly does. The question is whether those inequalities are best understood through a transhistorical category of settler-colonialism or through an analysis of capitalist property relations, class rule, and the integration of the post-apartheid state into global monopoly10 capital. The latter explains not only why inequalities persist, but also why a change in political sovereignty did not automatically abolish them.
B. Algeria
Algeria presents another difficulty for the settler-colonial framework because it is frequently cited as one of its clearest historical examples. Under French rule, large numbers of European settlers (the pieds-noirs) permanently settled in Algeria, appropriated land, and enjoyed political and legal privileges unavailable to the Indigenous population. If permanent settlement, demographic transformation, and land expropriation are decisive criteria, French Algeria clearly qualifies.11
However, the anti-colonial victory of the FLN and the departure of most European settlers after independence12 raises an immediate problem. By what criteria did Algeria cease being a settler colony? Was it the demographic departure of settlers? The transfer of state power? The achievement of formal sovereignty?
If state power and sovereignty are decisive, then the category begins to collapse into a broader analysis of colonial domination and national liberation. If demographic composition is decisive, then the framework becomes dependent on population ratios rather than relations of production. If land ownership is decisive, then numerous post-colonial societies would remain permanently settler-colonial despite having achieved national independence.
Algeria therefore demonstrates that even one of the framework’s strongest examples does not clarify the criteria by which settler-colonialism begins or ends. Marxism has no difficulty explaining the transformation: a colonial regime was overthrown through national liberation struggle and replaced by a nominally independent state that remains a semi-colony. The category of settler-colonialism adds little explanatory value beyond what is already captured by an analysis of colonialism, class power, and national liberation.
C. The Inuit
The problem becomes even more apparent when the framework is applied consistently to Indigenous nations themselves. Human history is filled with migration, territorial expansion, conflict, displacement, and incorporation of neighbouring peoples. The Inuit migrated eastward across the Arctic over centuries,13 expanding into territories previously occupied by other populations. Similar processes occurred among numerous Indigenous nations throughout North America.
This raises a fundamental question: what precisely distinguishes a “settler” migration from every other form of territorial expansion and population movement? If permanent settlement on occupied territory is sufficient, then many Indigenous societies would qualify. If displacement of existing populations is sufficient, the category expands further still. If demographic replacement is decisive, the distinction becomes even harder to maintain.
The case of Newfoundland is illustrative. While historians debate the precise relationship between Inuit expansion, European colonization, and the disappearance of the Beothuk,14 there is little dispute that multiple peoples competed, migrated, and struggled over territory long before the formation of Canada. Similar examples can be found throughout the continent.
This does not mean Indigenous peoples were “settler-colonial” in any meaningful political sense. Rather, it demonstrates the opposite: the criteria commonly employed by settler-colonial theory are so broad that they fail to distinguish capitalist colonial domination from the ordinary historical processes of migration, warfare, and territorial change found across human societies. Once these criteria are applied consistently, the category loses explanatory precision and becomes little more than a moral distinction between approved and disapproved forms of settlement.
D. Palestine
Palestine is frequently presented as a paradigmatic settler-colonial case.15 Yet Israel simultaneously functions as a regional military power, a technologically advanced capitalist economy, and a strategic outpost of principally US imperialism with its own imperialist class. Any serious analysis must explain how these determinations interact: how surplus is produced and appropriated, how the state is structured, and how imperialist backing conditions the conflict.
Settler-colonial theory collapses these contradictions. The result is moral clarity without analytic clarity. Strategy cannot be derived from mere analogy alone.
E. Latin America
If permanent settlement, land seizure, Indigenous dispossession, and demographic transformation are decisive criteria, then large parts of Latin America qualify straightforwardly as settler-colonial formations. European settlement, mass-elimination of Indigenous people for primitive accumulation, and enduring land concentration define much of the region’s history.
Yet contemporary Latin American societies are rarely analyzed primarily through the lens of “settler-colonialism.” Instead, Marxist analysis focuses on dependency, imperialism, and bureaucrat capitalism. This is not an oversight; it reflects the fact that class relations, state power, and imperialist dependency explain contemporary domination far more effectively than a “transhistorical” “settler” identity.
F. India and the Collapse of the Framework
India demonstrates the ultimate incoherence of the settler-colonial concept. British colonialism in India exhibited nearly all of the traits often cited as constitutive of settler-colonialism: large-scale land expropriation, destruction of pre-capitalist social relations,16 forced integration into global capitalism, mass famine, elimination and marginalization of entire communities, and enduring patterns of land concentration and underdevelopment.
What India lacked was mass permanent European settlement. If this single criterion is decisive, then the rest of the traits (economic destruction, land theft, elimination, and racialized domination) are suddenly secondary. If it is not decisive, then the distinction between “settler colonialism” from a broader “colonialism” as such collapses.
The British colonial project in India reorganized land tenure, commodified agriculture, destroyed local industry, and produced catastrophic human costs.17 From the standpoint of political economy, these processes are indistinguishable in kind from those that produced “settler” societies elsewhere. The difference lies not in moral structure but in the form of administration and the trajectory of capitalist development.
India thus exposes the core weakness of settler-colonial theory: once analysis returns to the mode of production and imperialism, the category loses all independent explanatory value. Detractors may argue it is still useful in that it has produced a distinct view with a focus on land, rather than labour. This is captured in many works analysing “settler-colonialism”. Common ideas are that for settler-colonialism to end, land needs to be viewed as a “relation” and sometimes even dives into land and objects as being “sentient” themselves. An issue with this is detaching land from the relations of production humans are under mystifies the process of who controls land, for what purpose, why, and how to conquer power for the colonised peoples of the world. With this, it is also worth looking at prevalent trends in settler-colonialism, being its direct post-modern variant, a third-worldist interpretation, and a blended version given by organisations such as the defunct “Bolshevik Union”.
J. Sakai’s Settlers
On the “left”, “settler-colonialism” is most often encountered not through academic texts but through J. Sakai’s Settlers: The Mythology of the White Proletariat. The influence of this text is profound—and so is its political incoherence. This book has already been thoroughly debunked by the erstwhile journal “Struggle Sessions”,18 but several points it makes are worth reiterating.
A. Fixed identity replaces contradiction
Sakai assigns political destiny on the basis of geography and ancestry rather than analyzing contradiction and struggle. This is not a communist method. Mao emphasizes that class positions and political consciousness are shaped through struggle and can transform under changing conditions.19 Settlers abandons this dialectic by treating “settlers” as a stable political category.
B. Labour aristocracy becomes metaphysics
Lenin’s analysis of labour aristocracy identifies a tendency under imperialism: monopoly superprofits allow the bourgeoisie to bribe upper layers of the working class.20 This tendency is uneven, historically conditioned, and reversible under crisis. Sakai converts it into an eternal verdict, transforming a strategic problem into a metaphysical impossibility with the entirety of the “settler” working class becoming labour aristocrats.
C. The absurd conclusion: political abstention
Even if one were to accept Sakai’s premises, his conclusions are politically absurd. If imperialist countries form the material base of global domination, then struggle within them has objective value regardless of who leads it. To argue that revolutionaries should do nothing in the “imperial core” is to argue for leaving imperialism undisturbed at its center. This is not revolutionary internationalism; it is abdication.
A coherent anti-imperialist line would insist that agitation, disruption, and class struggle in imperialist countries weaken the enemy and create openings globally. Settlers instead offers a theory that justifies inaction.
D. Who is a “settler”?
A question Settlers never resolves, along with every other understanding of “settler-colonialism” is who, concretely, constitutes a “settler.” Are immigrants settlers? Refugees displaced by imperialist wars? Migrant workers without citizenship? People arriving from the United States rather than Europe? The category expands or contracts according to polemical need, not analysis.
The absence of criteria reveals the underlying problem: “settler” functions as a moral signifier, not a class or political category.
Where Sakai’s line dominates, the results are consistent: abandonment of workplace organizing, contempt for mass line, and the formation of small moral sects. Failure to build organization is explained in advance by the alleged reactionary nature of the masses.
This critique is not a lone complaint. Struggle Sessions, for example, argues that Sakai must rely on an “unscientific understanding of colonialism” to present chauvinism as semi-permanent and to treat “settler consciousness” as fixed rather than historically conditioned and struggle-dependent.
The “Moderate” Variant: The Bolshevik Union and the Native National Question
Not all proponents of the settler-colonial framework adopt the extreme conclusions of contemporary Third-Worldism or post-modern decolonial theory. A number of Marxist-Leninist groups historically attempted to synthesize elements of national-liberation theory with an analysis of Canada as an imperialist country. A seminal example of the negative was the line of the Bolshevik Union (BU).
The BU argued that the Indigenous peoples of Canada constituted a colonized nation—“Native Canada”—which existed alongside English Canada and Quebec. As they wrote:
“Canada’s borders contain three nations: English Canada, French Canada, and Native Canada.”21
From this premise they derived a position that Indigenous peoples in Canada should be understood primarily through the framework of the colonial question rather than through the classical Marxist definition of a nation, and that Indigenous people essentially constituted one nation (something argued by modern Indigenous nationalists such as Ray Bobb).22 In fact, the BU explicitly rejected Stalin’s well-known criteria for nationhood, arguing that they were designed for European bourgeois nations rather than colonial situations, but did so without adequate demonstration as to why.
According to the BU, the northern regions of Canada functioned as a colonial economy whose resources were extracted by monopolies from southern Canada and the United States, while Indigenous populations remained impoverished and excluded from development. In this sense they argued that “Native Canada” should be treated as part of the Third World and thus possessed the right to self-determination in the same sense as colonial countries under imperial domination.
The political conclusion of this framework was clear: the revolutionary movement in Canada had to recognize the right of Indigenous peoples to secede and potentially wage a national liberation struggle against Canadian imperialism. Without this recognition, they argued, proletarian internationalism in Canada would be impossible.
At first glance this appears more sophisticated than contemporary “settler-colonial” discourse. It is grounded in classical Marxist terminology and attempts to link the Indigenous struggle to the global anti-imperialist movement. Yet a closer examination reveals that the theoretical problems remain fundamentally the same.
The most striking feature of the BU position is that it is not new. The Canadian Marxist-Leninist movement debated these questions extensively in the 1970s, and many of the arguments used today already received systematic criticism at that time.
The organization In Struggle! responded directly to the BU’s analysis, rejecting the idea that Indigenous peoples constituted a unified “Native nation” in the Marxist sense. Their critique emphasized the need for a concrete analysis of social formations rather than abstract analogies to Third World colonial struggles.
As they noted in their response,23 the BU’s position rested on forcing very diverse Indigenous societies into a single national framework. This criticism strikes at the core problem of the BU thesis. In order to sustain the idea of a colonized nation, the enormous diversity of Indigenous societies had to be collapsed into a single political category. What actually existed historically were multiple peoples with distinct social formations, many of which did not share a unified territory, language, or economic life.
In this sense the BU position inverted Marxist methodology. Rather than deriving political categories from material conditions, it began with a political conclusion “Native Canada as a colonized nation” and then forced historical realities to conform to it.
The BU also relied heavily on analogies between Canada’s North and classical colonial economies. For example, they argued that northern development mirrored patterns found in the Third World, where infrastructure exists primarily to extract resources for imperialist centers. There is an element of truth in this observation. Resource extraction in northern Canada has indeed been organized largely for the benefit of southern capital. However, the BU drew from this a far broader conclusion: that the entire region constituted a colonial formation equivalent to colonized countries. However, this reasoning is flawed. The colonial analogy obscures the class relations operating within these regions. By treating northern Canada primarily as a colonial formation, the BU’s analysis subordinated class contradictions to a national narrative. This is precisely what Marxist critics warned against. The national question must be analyzed concretely, distinguishing between class interests within each nation and between different social groups.
The most fundamental weakness of the BU position is its treatment of Indigenous peoples as a unified revolutionary subject. In their analysis, the Indigenous struggle appears primarily as a national struggle against imperialism. Yet this framing leaves little room for examining internal class divisions or the emergence of Indigenous bourgeois and petty-bourgeois strata. This problem becomes even clearer in the contemporary context. Indigenous corporations, land development corporations, and resource partnerships now operate within and partner with Canadian imperialism. These actors participate directly in capitalist accumulation and often act as landlords, investors, or corporate partners. A purely national framework cannot explain these developments. Once class divisions emerge within Indigenous communities (as they inevitably do under capitalism) the assumption of a unified “national liberation struggle” becomes ridiculous and idealist.
Despite its revolutionary rhetoric, the BU position ultimately leads to a political impasse. If Indigenous peoples constitute a colonized nation analogous to the Third World, then the revolutionary subject within Canada is displaced. The central dynamic of revolution becomes a national liberation struggle rather than proletarian revolution within a capitalist state. This is precisely the tendency that later evolved into contemporary Third-Worldist and settler-colonial theories. In these frameworks, the working class in imperialist countries is treated as structurally complicit in imperialism, while revolutionary fervour is transferred to colonized peoples alone.
What is striking about these debates is how contemporary they sound. Many arguments circulating today about colonial economies, settler populations, and national liberation inside imperialist states were already articulated and contested decades ago. The debates of the 1970s demonstrate that these positions were not simply overlooked by the Marxist movement; they were examined, criticized, and rejected. The fundamental issue then, as now, was the same: whether the national question should be analyzed through concrete political economy or through abstract analogies to colonial struggles elsewhere. In this sense the resurgence of these theories today does not represent theoretical innovation. It represents the reappearance of arguments that were already recognized as politically and theoretically flawed. The task of Marxists is therefore not to rediscover these frameworks, but to return to a rigorous analysis of capitalism, class structure, and national oppression grounded in historical materialism.
Class must be principal
A materialist analysis of colonialism in Canada must grasp not only Indigenous dispossession but the full structure of class and national oppression produced by imperialist capitalism. Firstly, things must be understood principally through class. The Canadian big bourgeoisie is an imperialist class integrated into monopoly and finance capital. It is the principal enemy of both the Indigenous working class and the non-Indigenous working class. To frame colonialism primarily as a conflict between “settlers” and Indigenous peoples obscures this shared antagonism and weakens the basis for revolutionary unity. Similarly, settler-colonial discourse routinely treats Indigenous peoples as a homogeneous oppressed mass. This is false and politically dangerous. Like all nations under capitalism, Indigenous nations contain class divisions. The existence of Indigenous bureaucrat capitalists, compradors, etc is not a betrayal of “tradition”; it is a predictable outcome of capitalist penetration.
The Sen̓áḵw (Senak’w) development in Vancouver illustrates this clearly. Marketed as “Indigenous-led decolonization,” the project is a high-density luxury real-estate development operated through partnerships between the Squamish Nation’s development arm and private capital, including firms linked to Westbank. In this arrangement, Indigenous corporate entities function as landlords and developers, extracting rent from workers, Indigenous and non-Indigenous alike. They are not outside capitalism; they are integrated into it. These formations are enemies of both the Indigenous proletariat and the broader working class. A framework that cannot identify Indigenous capital as capital is analytically bankrupt.
A further issue with the settler-colonial theory in Canada is that it centers Indigenous peoples almost exclusively. In Canada, the Acadian nation for example, remains an oppressed nation and has experienced deportation, land seizure, and cultural suppression under British colonial rule. They constitute an oppressed nation whose history cannot be reduced to “settler” status without erasing their concrete reality as an oppressed nation under Canadian imperialism. A Marxist approach recognizes multiple national questions within a single state and analyzes each concretely. A framework that recognizes only one oppressed group by definition cannot grasp the totality of oppression produced by imperialist states.
The strategic conclusion is not moral flattening but political clarity. The principal contradiction runs between the imperialist bourgeoisie and the working classes, Indigenous and non-Indigenous alike. National chauvanism and racism are real obstacles, but they are produced and weaponized by the bourgeois state. But, like any other reactionary idea amongst the working-class, they are fought through class struggle and organization, not through abandoning analysis of class.
For National-liberation
If we abandon “settler-colonialism” as a primary framework, what replaces it is not silence or liberal “reconciliation”, but a more rigorous materialism, national-liberation for oppressed nations. Strategy begins from contradictions in the working class, including chauvinism, and organizes to split the class from bourgeois agents and build independent organs of struggle. This is not “class reductionism.” It is the necessary condition for revolutionary politics: without political economy and state analysis, anti-colonial language becomes a supplement for liberalism.
“Settler-colonialism”, as commonly deployed, is a postmodern abstraction that replaces political economy with morality, class struggle with identity, and strategy with despair. Its academic form dissolves into typology; its popular left form (crystallized in Settlers) produces liquidationism by foreclosing mass work in the imperial core.
A Marxist approach does not deny colonialism; it explains it through the capitalist mode of production, imperialism, land as capital, and the coercive and administrative machinery of the bourgeois state. It refuses the politics of confession and symbolic “unsettling” and returns the question to its decisive terrain: organization, class struggle, and the confrontation with state power.
Now, this should be sufficient to dispel the idea that “settler-colonialism” is of any use to the national-liberation of oppressed nations. However, there have been various attempts to reconcile the opposing ideas of settler-colonialism and Marxism. Pt. 2 will look at modern variants of this, and continue to dispel the attempts by many to fit the counter-revolutionary idea of settler-colonialism into Marxism.
1https://pages.ucsd.edu/~rfrank/class_web/ES-270/Wolfe-Elimination%20of%20the%20Native.pdf
2https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/settler-colonialism-and-the-transformation-of-anthropology-9780304701112/
3https://link.springer.com/book/10.1057/9780230299196
4https://www.routledge.com/Introducing-Settler-Colonial-Studies/Veracini/p/book/9781138185031
5https://archive.org/details/in-theory-classes-nations-literatures-aijaz-ahmad
6https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-2/mswv2_26.htm
7https://pages.ucsd.edu/~rfrank/class_web/ES-270/Wolfe-Elimination%20of%20the%20Native.pdf
8https://www.routledge.com/Introducing-Settler-Colonial-Studies/Veracini/p/book/9781138185031
9https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201802/landauditreport13feb2018.pdf
10https://www.ukzn.ac.za/staff/bond-patrick/
11https://www.britannica.com/event/Algerian-War
12https://archive.org/details/savagewarofpeace0000horn
13https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/inuit
14https://www.heritage.nf.ca/articles/indigenous/beothuk.php
15https://us.macmillan.com/books/9781250787656/thehundredyearswaronpalestine
16https://cup.columbia.edu/book/a-theory-of-imperialism/9780231196906
17https://archive.org/details/politicaleconomy0000bagc
18https://strugglesessions.org/2023/02/08/the-historical-development-of-the-u-s-proletariat-a-rebuff-of-j-sakais-settlers/
19https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-1/mswv1_16.htm
20https://www.marxists.org/archive//lenin//works/1916/oct/x01.htm
21https://www.marxists.org/history/erol/ca.secondwave/nationhood.htm
22https://kites-journal.org/2023/08/02/if-indians-cannot-develop-into-a-modern-nation-then-they-will-disappear/
23https://www.marxists.org/history/erol/ca.secondwave/reply-bu.htm