After nearly three months on strike, roughly 300 Signals and Communications workers at Canadian Pacific Kansas City Railway returned to work on August 24. The strike did not end with workers ratifying a negotiated collective agreement. Instead, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers System Council No. 11 and CPKC agreed to submit the remaining issues to binding arbitration.1 The dispute offers important lessons for workers across Canada about arbitration, anti-scab legislation, craft division, and the necessity of rank-and-file organization.
The weakness of the strike was certainly not an unwillingness of the workers to fight. Signals and Communications workers voted 96% in favour of strike action. Their demands concerned wages, expenses incurred while working for the company, extensive on-call obligations, difficult schedules, and problems retaining experienced workers.2 The workers perform specialized work necessary for the safe operation of the railway. Against them stood CPKC, a continental railway monopoly operating throughout Canada, the United States and Mexico.
Nor was CPKC incapable of making concessions. During the strike the corporation reported quarterly revenues exceeding $4.1 billion and operating income approaching $1.5 billion.3 Yet CPKC argued that the workers’ demands exceeded increases negotiated with other sections of its workforce. Here the fragmented organization of workers becomes useful to the employer. What one bargaining unit previously accepted is used to establish the limits of what another is supposedly entitled to demand. The decisive moment came near the end of the strike. On August 17, workers overwhelmingly rejected CPKC’s latest offer. With 96.6% turnout, 256 workers voted against the proposal and only 31 voted to accept it, an 89.2% rejection.4 Four days later, CPKC announced that the dispute would proceed to binding arbitration and that the workers would return to work.5
The publicly available record does not establish whether the membership held a separate vote specifically authorizing arbitration, and it would therefore be wrong to claim that arbitration was imposed against such a vote. But the contradiction remains significant. An exceptionally united membership had just rejected the company’s offer after almost three months of striking. Days later, the strike ended and the outstanding questions were removed from direct struggle between the workers and employer and placed before an arbitrator. This is particularly important because CPKC had advocated binding arbitration from the opening days of the dispute. IBEW First District initially criticized this approach and correctly warned that “arbitration must not become a shortcut.”6
The economic leverage workers possess in collective bargaining comes fundamentally from their ability to collectively withhold their labour. Lawyers, negotiators and mediators may assist a struggle, but they do not create this leverage. A railway can possess billions of dollars in capital, locomotives, track and signalling equipment, but none of it operates without labour. By striking collectively, workers can interrupt production and impose economic costs upon the capitalist. Binding arbitration nevertheless weakens even this economic leverage. Workers return to work, production resumes, and an outside third party determines unresolved terms. An arbitration award may still contain gains, and workers who have endured months without regular wages cannot simply be condemned for accepting arbitration under difficult circumstances. But the employer receives an immediate end to disruption while the workers surrender their ability to continue imposing economic pressure through the strike. Decisions of this importance should therefore remain under direct rank-and-file control.
The CPKC struggle was also an important test of the federal government’s new restrictions on replacement workers. Bill C-58, which came into force in June 2025, prohibits federally regulated employers from using several forms of replacement labour during legal strikes and lockouts.7 This was a genuine concession won through decades of labour struggle. But the dispute also demonstrated the distinction between possessing a right under bourgeois law and possessing the organization necessary to effectively defend workers’ interests. During the strike, the IBEW filed 19 complaints alleging improper use of replacement workers. CPKC denied violating the law.8 Whatever the final outcome of these complaints, the practical contradiction is obvious. A strike operates immediately. If struck work continues while complaints travel through hearings and administrative procedures, workers can lose leverage during precisely the period when economic pressure matters most.
The lesson is not that workers should reject anti-scab legislation. Every restriction imposed upon strikebreaking improves the conditions under which workers can struggle. But labour legislation cannot become a substitute for organization. The bourgeois state regulates the conflict between labour and capital; it does not cease being the political instrument of bourgeois rule because one of its institutions occasionally rules in favour of a union. The strike also exposed the continuing weakness created by craft division. CPKC operates as a unified industrial enterprise. Signal workers, engineers, conductors, maintenance workers, mechanics and others collectively operate the same railway. Yet the workers confront the corporation through separate crafts, unions and bargaining units.
Capital is industrially organized while labour remains fragmented. This allows a corporation employing thousands of workers to isolate several hundred workers in one bargaining unit while attempting to maintain the wider operation. The immediate answer is not to abandon existing unions, which would frequently leave workers less organized. It is to develop organization from below that crosses jurisdictional boundaries. Rank-and-file committees should establish permanent links between workers throughout the same workplace and industry, coordinate agitation and solidarity, and struggle against the divisions that prevent workers from acting together.
The lesson of CPKC is therefore neither that workers should strike less nor that sufficiently militant trade unionism will gradually overcome capitalism. Workers require stronger rank-and-file organization precisely so that their economic struggles can become schools of class struggle rather than remaining confined to wages and conditions. They must learn through these struggles not only how to confront an individual employer, but what institutions defend the capitalist class, why workers remain divided, and why their ultimate liberation requires political struggle against bourgeois rule itself. The railway is organized as one industrial machine. Its workers should increasingly organize across the divisions imposed upon them. But organization in the economic struggle is only one part of the task.
1Canadian Pacific Kansas City, “CPKC and IBEW agree to binding arbitration ending strike,” August 21, 2026.
2IBEW First District, “IBEW System Council No. 11 Commences Strike at CPKC,” June 2026.
3Canadian Pacific Kansas City, Q2 2026 financial results.
4Progressive Railroading, “Canadian IBEW members reject latest CPKC contract offer,” August 17, 2026.
5Canadian Pacific Kansas City, “CPKC and IBEW agree to binding arbitration ending strike,” August 21, 2026.
6IBEW First District, “IBEW First District Stands in Full Support of System Council No. 11 Members at CPKC,” June 2026.
7Employment and Social Development Canada, “Amendments to the Canada Labour Code related to replacement workers and the maintenance of activities process,” June 20, 2025.
8Progressive Railroading, “Canadian IBEW members reject latest CPKC contract offer,” August 17, 2026.